Russian soldiers remove the swastika from a factory in Voykova, Kerch. 1944.
The faintest hint came from the Battle of Moscow in the harsh winter of 1941. That the invincible German juggernaut was not infallible. Stalingrad underlined it boldly. The days of Hitler were numbered. It was only a matter of time. Kursk was the last strong surge by the Germans to clutch at the rapidly receding victory in Russia.
After that the downfall had begun. A long series of hard fought battles that the German army fought with desperation but all adding to the increasing gloom of the approaching disaster.
We start here with Crimea.
A German soldier surrenders in 1944 somewhere in the Crimea
GERMANS LOSE CRIMEA: HISTORY IN BRIEF
GERMANS LOSE CRIMEA: HISTORY IN BRIEF
The Crimean Offensive (8 April - 12 May 1944) — known in German sources as the Battle of the Crimea — was a series of offensives by the Red Army in the effort to liberate Crimea from the German Wehrmacht occupation. The Red Army's 4th Ukrainian Front engaged the German 17th Army of Army Group South, which consisted of German and Romanian formations, in an operation to liberate the Crimean peninsula. The result of the battle was complete victory for the Red Army, and a botched evacuation effort across the Black Sea, leading to significant German and Romanian losses.
During late 1943 and early 1944, the Wehrmacht was pressed back along its entire frontline in the east. In October 1943, the 17th Army was forced to retreat from the Kuban Bridgehead across the Kerch Strait to Crimea. During the following months, the Red Army pushed back the Wehrmacht in southern Ukraine, eventually cutting off the land-based connection of 17th Army through the Perekop Isthmus in November 1943
Soviet landings across the Kerch Strait and in the north-eastern sector of the Crimea near Sivash at the end of 1943 set the stage for the liberation of the Crimea from the Germans. For nearly 5 months, the Soviets turned their attention away from the Crimea, instead focusing on pushing Army Group South out of Ukraine, which they were able to do with the highly successful Lower Dnieper and Dnieper-Carpathian Offensives.
An assault across the Perekop Isthmus was launched on 8 April by elements of the 4th Ukrainian Front's 2nd Guards and 51st Armies. The 17th Army fought well but was unable to stop the advance. Kerch was liberated by the Separate Coastal Army on 11 April; Simferopol, about 37 mi (60 km) northeast of Sevastopol, followed two days later. The 17th Army was retreating toward Sevastopol by 16 April with remaining Axis forces in the Crimea concentrating around the city by the end of the third week of April.
The OKW intended to hold Sevastopol as a fortress, as the Red Army had done during the first battle for the Crimea in 1941-1942. However, inadequate preparations made a prolonged defence impossible against the rapid Soviet advance. Fighting broke out in the city outskirts towards the end of April and the city fell on 9 May, less than a month after the start of the offensive.
The Axis sea evacuation to Constanța was attacked by Soviet land-based bombers. The last Axis pockets in the Crimea were destroyed on 12 May.
The German and Romanian formations suffered very high irrecoverable losses of 97,000 men, many of whom drowned during the evacuation. The sinking of the Totila and Teja on 10 May alone caused up to 10,000 deaths.
German losses:
Killed and missing: 31,700
Wounded: 33,400
Total: 65,100
Killed and missing: 31,700
Wounded: 33,400
Total: 65,100
Romanian losses:
Killed and missing: 25,800
Wounded: 5,800
Total: 31,600
Killed and missing: 25,800
Wounded: 5,800
Total: 31,600
Total Axis:
Killed and missing: 57,500
Wounded: 39,200
Total: 96,700
Killed and missing: 57,500
Wounded: 39,200
Total: 96,700
A column of German POW in the Crimea. 1944.
Situation as published in the Charlotte News on April 12, 1944
Image source
The Commander-in-Chief of the Seventeenth Army, Generaloberst Jaennecke,
realized this and ordered plans drawn up and preparations made for a fast, staged
evacuation of the Crimea along the Isthmus of Perekop toward the lower Dniepr
River. It was his belief that holding on to the Crimea was of no military value
whatsoever; on the other hand, his army could significantly strengthen the
southern wing of the German eastern front.
The Seventeenth Army was already cut off from the mainland and on its own,
it was engaged in battle with enemy forces near Perekop and Kerch, and the army's
commanders were convinced that an evacuation by sea was inevitable in the near
future. In spite of this Hitler stuck to his decision: no matter what, the Crimea was
to be defended with all means available. To back up his decision Hitler had two
more German divisions1 sent to the Crimea as reinforcements, though two divisions
was completely inadequate.
The Russians knew that the Crimea, and if it stayed, the Seventeenth Army,
were theirs. They dropped leaflets urging the defenders to desert, mocking the
German position: "The Crimea is our largest and most secure prisoner-of-war camp.
The Germans feed themselves, guard themselves and when they go on leave they
even return voluntarily. We are in no hurry to take the Crimea."
Street fighting in Kerch. 1943
Russian officers pose on top of the wreck of a downed German Messerschmitt fighter. 1944.
VIDEO: HAPPIER TIMES FOR THE GERMANS: OCCUPY CRIMEA 1942
Captured German POW in the Crimea. 1944
Russian soldiers examine a wrecked German Panzer 3
Then, however, the entire situation on the Eastern Front began to deteriorate.
From mid-March the Germans were forced to abandon their defenses on the Lower
Dniepr, and Soviet offensives along the entire southern front forced Army Group
A back beyond the Dnestr. On April 10, Odessa, the Seventeenth Army's most
important supply base and port, fell to the Russians. This meant that the army was
now totally isolated, 300 kilometers from the new German front, and that from now
on it would have to be supplied from the Rumanian port of Constanza, which meant
a much loner sea journey. There was till time, however, to evacuate the army by
sea with all of its men, horses and materiel. But Hitler stubbornly refused and
forbade any evacuation.
With the German northern front smashed, the enemy had a free
entrance to the Crimea. As there were no further forces or reserves available, and
since the rear of XXXXIX Mountain Corps was also threatened, on April 10 the
Seventeenth Army gave the order for a withdrawal toward Sevastopol. The
German and Rumanian forces faced a difficult retreat over 160 kilometers of open
terrain lacking significant natural obstacles. The result was a race with the pursuing
Soviet tanks and motorized infantry.
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The exhausted men breathed a sigh of relief, they had made it. They had
reached Sevastopol, and here was the harbor from which they would sail across the
Black Sea to freedom. Unbeknown to them, however, a new order from Hitler,
issued on April 12 while the retreat was still under way, had arrived, striking the
army command a crushing blow: although the Crimea had been lost, the fortress
of Sevastopol was to be held indefinitely. That those in the Führer Headquarters
imagined the battered units could do so was inconceivable.
VIDEO: HAPPIER TIMES FOR THE GERMANS: OCCUPY CRIMEA 1942
The unending columns, mostly train units and surviving German
and Rumanian units, streamed south in the direction of the fortress of
Sevastopol. There was now no one who could restore order. The many
small groups of infantry interspersed among the columns stopped,
fought briefly and then hurried westward again. Late on the afternoon
of April 13 the 'main body' of the 98th Division reached Ssudak and
halted. The hours of waiting made the soldiers jumpy and uneasy. It
became dark. Firing began. First it was only an anti-tank gun. Shell after
shell landed in the village. It was the opening act of a partisan ambush
of the columns as they prepared to move on. Hand grenades came flying
down. Submachine-gun fire sprayed from windows and rooftops. There
were muzzle flashes everywhere. Several trucks drove away, but became
lost in the darkness and got stuck. The columns were close to panic.
There was still a few of the 'old warriors' left, however, and they saved
the situation by placing well-aimed bursts of fire on the muzzle flashes.
Soon things had quieted down; the threat of panic had been averted. The
columns resumed their march at about midnight.
Sevastopol at that time was the scene of tremendous confusion. Commanders
assembled their troops, headquarters tried to establish contact with their units, new
units were created out of thin air, supplies and munitions were organized, sectors
assigned and command posts set up. A steady flow of stragglers, men who had
escaped the Russians, was arriving from all over the Crimea, in ones and twos, on
foot or in overcrowded vehicles. Parking areas were filled with large numbers of
useless and abandoned vehicles of every kind. An especially sad fate awaited the
many horses.
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On Hitler's orders no more units were
permitted to leave the Crimea. The order from the army command on April 16 read:
There will not be one step back in the defense of the fortress of Sevastopol!
Viewed in the short term, this order was justifiable in permitting an orderly
evacuation of the many personnel still on the peninsula. The fighting troops saw
this, and even though conditions were extremely difficult they retained the
necessary fighting spirit. Even after the deep disappointment caused by Hitler's
renewed order to hold out, the soldiers still trusted their Commander-in-Chief, the
man who had brought them out of the Kuban Bridgehead in an orderly manner.
They were prepared to fight on until the order finally came to evacuate the Crimea
and the ships arrived to take them away. Keeping the harbor and coast free for this
purpose depended on their steadfastness.
Sevastopol was not the fortress it had been in early 1942, when it took German forces weeks of the heaviest fighting to capture it. The mighty fortress works had been shot up and blown apart, German-installed naval guns and coastal batteries faced seaward, the existing bunkers, forts and casemates had not been repaired an were serving as bullet-proof accommodations for headquarters, hospitals, assembly areas and so on. The field positions in the main line of resistance had been beefed up, with barbed wire in front, but there was no in-depth system of defenses with strongpoints or a second and third line. Because of the hard limestone the trenches could not be dug deep enough. The only well-built rear position was on the small Khersonyes Peninsula. The poor state of the fortress was not the only disadvantage facing the defenders. During the retreat the Luftwaffe had lost all its airfields in the Crimea and was left with only two fields near Sevastopol and on the Khersonyes Peninsula, which would soon be under Soviet artillery fire.
Sevastopol was not the fortress it had been in early 1942, when it took German forces weeks of the heaviest fighting to capture it. The mighty fortress works had been shot up and blown apart, German-installed naval guns and coastal batteries faced seaward, the existing bunkers, forts and casemates had not been repaired an were serving as bullet-proof accommodations for headquarters, hospitals, assembly areas and so on. The field positions in the main line of resistance had been beefed up, with barbed wire in front, but there was no in-depth system of defenses with strongpoints or a second and third line. Because of the hard limestone the trenches could not be dug deep enough. The only well-built rear position was on the small Khersonyes Peninsula. The poor state of the fortress was not the only disadvantage facing the defenders. During the retreat the Luftwaffe had lost all its airfields in the Crimea and was left with only two fields near Sevastopol and on the Khersonyes Peninsula, which would soon be under Soviet artillery fire.
A German signboard at the entrance to the seafront in Sevastapol. A relic from the recent past when the Germans briefly ruled .
The initial difficult and costly positional fighting saw all enemy attacks
repulsed; the northern front held firm. On April 27 the Soviets felt strong enough
to launch their first major attack. Supported by large numbers of tanks and closesupport
aircraft, they struck in the southeast, attacking toward the Sapun Heights.
The attack collapsed with heavy casualties. The Soviets had not yet completed
their artillery buildup, however. Mercifully, the troops had not learned of Hitler's
obstinate, completely incomprehensible order. However, it was clear to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Seventeenth Army that Sevastopol could not be held
much longer, and that a total evacuation was imperative if the army was not to be
lost. The enemy was building up his forces rapidly, the situation was becoming
ever more acute and it was only a question of time until the German front was
overrun, which would mean the end. Generaloberst Jaennecke therefore decided
on an unusual step. On April 28 he flew to Führer Headquarters to convince Hitler
to authorize an immediate and total evacuation. In spite of his forcible presentation
Hitler remained unmoved. Finally, his rage became so great that he relieved
Jaennecke as Commander-in-Chief of the army and forbade him from returning to
Sevastopol. General Allmendinger assumed command of the army.
For more than half a year the Seventeenth Army had held the Crimea, following
an insane order. Now the end was near for the remaining defenders. No more ships
came to pick them up. When the morning of May 12 dawned the Black Sea was
again empty and quiet and endlessly wide.
Since any further resistance had become senseless, at about 0800 the bulk of
the remaining troops in the area of the northern embarkation points, including the
commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, Generalmajor Böhme, surrendered.
Artillery fired on the barely 25-meter-wide beach between the bluffs and the
sea at the embarkation points on the western coast, where several thousand men
still cowered among the rocks and crevices and at the steep cliffs. Then Russian
tanks attacked the last line of defence. Further resistance was useless.
General
Gruner, commander of the 111th Infantry Division, walked toward one of the tanks
to surrender. The tank opened fire, killing the General.
Then, as was so often the
case with the Soviets, the officers and highly-decorated soldiers were led away
from the others. This was followed by shots and screams. The remaining Russian
auxiliaries who had served the Germans were lined up along the cliffs and shot.
Then, on this hot summer day, the last remnants of the Seventeenth Army, over
15,000 Germans and Rumanian troops, were assembled into long columns and
marched past the whirring Soviet newsreel cameras into captivity. For most of
them there would be no return.
Other groups of German troops refused to surrender and continued to hold out.
German aerial reconnaissance revealed that elements were still holding out around
the embarkation points at 1500, probably in the desperate hope that they would still
be rescued. They held out until their ammunition was gone.
Others preferred to risk everything rather than be captured.
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