Striking Second World War Images In COLOR

 1941. Cocky German soldiers in Russia as the country burns.

 A cigarette break for German soldiers in the endless expanse of Russia, which eventually defeated the Germans.

 The nemesis of the once invincible German war machine: Russian soldiers. Here they move ghost-like in the woods into an attack.

 A face that the world believed would never be seen. That of a beaten, starving German soldier. Stalingrad.

Stalingrad again.

 Grateful to an ally. Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov (1896-1974) and Konstantin Rokossovsky (1896-1968) talking to Bernard Montgomery (1887-1976) near the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. The Soviet marshals were awarded the British Order of the Bath (the fourth largest award in the UK) of different classes: GK Zhukov - Honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, and KK Rokossovsky - Honorary Knight Commander Order of the Bath.

Young German soldiers taken prisoner by the Americans in the area of ​​Saint-Denis-le-Gast (Saint-Denis-le-Gast).

Adolf Hitler hears the report from a soldier. Behind the back of the Fuehrer, on the left - Gen. Alfred Jodl, on the right - Hitler's adjutant, Major Gerhard Engel. Presumably in 1939-1940.

The American battleship USS Idaho fires on Japanese fortifications on Okinawa.

 1939. Occupied Poland. A German soldier chats up Polish women.

 Destroyed German Panzer 4 tanks at Lanuvio, Italy

 Russian soldiers with KV 1S tanks

THE RUSSIAN TANK: KV 1S

The Kliment Voroshilov (KV) tanks were a series of Soviet heavy tanks, named after the Soviet defense commissar and politician Kliment Voroshilov. The KV series were known for their extremely heavy armour protection during the early war, especially during the first year of the invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II. Almost completely immune to the 3.7 cm KwK 36 and howitzer-like, short barreled 7.5 cm KwK 37 guns mounted respectively on the early Panzer III and Panzer IV tanks, until better guns were developed often the only way to defeat a KV was a point-blank shot to the rear. Prior to the invasion, about 500 of the over 22,000 tanks in Soviet service at the time were of the KV-1 type. When the KV-1 appeared, it outclassed the French Char B1, the only heavy tank used in the world at that time. Yet in the end it turned out that there was little sense in producing the expensive KV tanks, as the T-34 medium tank performed better (or at least equally) in all practical respects. Later in the war, the KV series became a base of development of the Iosif Stalin tanks.

KV-1S was a lighter variant of late 1942 with higher speed, but thinner armour. A new, smaller, cast turret and redesigned rear hull were used. 1370 of them were built.

 Russian soldiers with T-34/76F tanks

The T-34 Medium Tank is by far the most famous Soviet weapon of the Second World War, and has become a symbol of the Red Army’s desperate struggle against the Germans. In 1941 it was the most advanced tank then in mass production, and nearly 1,000 were present on the front line at the start of Operation Barbarossa, but like every other Soviet tank the T-34 was swept aside in the first phase of German victories. After this inauspicious start, the T-34 began to appear in ever larger numbers on the Eastern Front, and during the crucial battles around Stalingrad and at Kursk was almost the only tank in use with the Red Army. The "F" variant was developed in 1943.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_t-34_develop_combat.html

A few bad men. Fritz Darges, Franz von Papen, Nicolaus von Below and Dr Karl Brandt

WHO WERE THESE GUYS?

Fritz Darges (8 February 1913 – 25 October 2009) was an Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) in the Waffen SS during World War II who was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. He was Hitler's adjutant for a year till July 1944. On 18 July 1944, during a strategy conference in the Wolfsschanze, a fly began buzzing around the room, allegedly landing on Hitler's shoulder and on the surface of a map several times. Irritated, Hitler ordered Darges to dispatch the nuisance. Darges suggested that, as it was an airborne pest, the job should go to the Luftwaffe adjutant, Nicolaus von Below. Enraged, Hitler dismissed Darges on the spot and had him banished to the Eastern Front. Another version of this story claims Darges was merely snickering as Hitler looked up from the map.

Franz von Papen  belonged to the group of close advisers to President Paul von Hindenburg in the late Weimar Republic. It was largely Papen, believing that Hitler could be controlled once he was in the government, who persuaded Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor in a cabinet not under Nazi Party domination. However, Papen and his allies were quickly marginalized by Hitler and he left the government after the Night of the Long Knives, during which some of his confidants were killed by the Nazis.

Nicolaus von Below (20 September 1907 – 24 July 1983) was an officer in the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) before and during World War II. He was the Luftwaffe adjutant to Hitler from 1937-45. After the war, Below wrote a book containing the memoirs of his service during World War II entitled  At Hitler's Side (2001). He died in Detmold, Germany, in 1983.

Karl Brandt (January 8, 1904 – June 2, 1948) was a German Nazi war criminal. He rose to the rank of SS-Gruppenführer in the Allgemeine-SS and SS-Brigadeführer in the Waffen-SS. Among other positions, Brandt headed the administration of the Nazi euthanasia program from 1939 onwards and was selected as Adolf Hitler's personal physician in August 1934. In 1942, he became Reich Commissioner for Health and Sanitation. He was involved in criminal human experimentation, along with his deputy Werner Heyde and others. After World War II, Brandt was convicted of crimes against humanity. He was hanged on June 2, 1948.

 Old German women watch haplessly as Russian tanks roll on the streets of Berlin. May 1945

 Paris. 1942. German soldiers talk to a Jew. Jews were supposed to wear a yellow star.

May 9, 1945. Russian commanders address their troops at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin.

British POW at Dunkirk. Western soldiers were treated decently by the Germans. It was the "Untermenschen" Russian soldiers who got the rough treatment.

The Balkans in flames. German tanks in the Serbian city of Nis, Spring 1941

German bombers drop a bomb somewhere in western Europe

June 22, 1941

Eva Braun. Almost as good as Marilyn Monroe?

Hitler takes a salute from his soldiers in occupied Poland. 1939.

Downfall: TARNOPOL: 4500 German Soldiers; 55 Survived

Exhausted German soldiers in Tarnopol. March 1944

Ternopil. In 1941 the city was occupied by the Germans who continued exterminating the population by murdering the Jews and sending others as forced labour to Germany. In April 1944 the city was retaken by the Red Army, the remaining Polish population having been previously expelled. During the Soviet reoccupation in March and April 1944, the city was encircled and completely destroyed. In March 1944 the city was declared a fortified place by Adolf Hitler, to be defended until the last round was shot. The stiff German resistance caused extensive use of heavy artillery by the Red Army, resulting in the complete destruction of the city and killing of nearly all German defenders. (55 survivors out of 4,500) Unlike many other occasions, where the Germans had practised a scorched earth policy during their withdrawal from territories of the Soviet Union, the devastation was caused directly by the hostilities.

Source: http://www.balagan.org.uk/war/ww2/tarnopol/index.htm

In 1944 Tarnopol was a town of 35,000 people (Buchner, 1995). The city was about 40 km west of the old Soviet-Polish border on the east bank of the River Seret. It had been Polish from 1920, was annexed by the Soviets in 1939, and captured by the Germans in 1941 (Wikipedia: Tarnopol Voivodship). The town was a transport hub with several railway lines running through it, the most significant being the Lvov to Odessa line which was the last railway line east of the Carparthians linking these two cities. Cutting this railway line would force the Germans to supply their southern forces via the long route through Rumania. Tarnopol was in a largely flat area, although a sprinkling of low hills, small woods, and villages dotted the plain. The River Seret and a marsh bordered lake cut off the western section of the town, comprising the suburbs of Zagrobela and Kukowce, from the main part of town. The connection was via a bridge over a dam. Moniushko (2005) described the town as being of "well built brick" houses, although Buchner says "stone". Tarnopol was a German garrison town (4,600 men after reinforcements) and its only defences were field fortifications within a 2-3 km radius of the city centre. The town also lacked an airfield, and during the siege the garrison had to rely solely on unreliable air drops for supplies.

 Note: Tarnopol (Polish) is also called Ternopol (Russian) and Ternopil (Ukrainian). Tarnopol was the name used in 1944.

The Russians pass an immobilised German tank in the town

Mud Offensive

The Russian "Mud Offensive" began on 4 Mar Zhukov (Erickson, 1996). Two Russian Fronts were operating in the vicinity of Tarnopol. Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian Front in front of Tarnopol and Koniev's 2nd Ukrainian Front to the south-east. As it only had indirect bearing on the events at Tarnopol I'll describe Koniev's activities first. The 2nd Ukrainian Front kicked off a day after Zhukov's men at dawn (0750 hours) on 5 Mar 1944. They smashed the German defences on the Gornyi Tikich and took the German depot at Uman on 10 Mar. On the evening of 11 Mar Russian units took the Dzhulinka and Gaivoron crossings on the Bug. Within 48 hours Russian units had crossed the river on a 80 km front. At 1300 hours on 17 Mar the lead units reached the Dniester and put bridgeheads on the western bank . On 19 Mar Moghilev-Podolskii was cleared allowing a full crossing of the Dniester - a entire Corps was across by noon on 21 Mar. This operation pushed the right flank of First Panzer Army back to the northwest away from the left flank of Eighth Army. Koniev's men reached the Soviet-Rumanian border on 25 Mar.

-----------------------
From Buchner, A. (1995). Ostfront 1944

Other radio messages reached the commanding XXXXVIII Panzer Corps on April 1, including a report on equipment losses. For the three day period beginning March 30 these losses totalled thirty machine-guns, twelve heavy mortars, one light and one heavy infantry gun, one anti-tank gun and one anti-aircraft gun - a considerable loss of heavy weapons which could not be replaced. 

The utter hopelessness of the situation became clear to Generalmajor  von Neindorff, who had questioned the suitability of Ternopol as a "fortified place" from the beginning. He radioed: "Despite bitter resistance unable to hold on any longer. Request Führer's permission for a breakout attempt.

"Hitler's answer was not long in coming. That same day he decided that the"fortified place" was to continue to be held until it was possible to restore contact.But Ternopol had never been a "fortified place," and had now become a pocket

--------------------------

Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian Front attacked at 0800 hours on 4 Mar (Erickson, 1996). The rail line to Tarnopol was the central axis of advance, coinciding with the junction between Fourth and First Panzer Armies. Within 48 hours, and despite the clinging mud, the Russians had broken through on a 160 km front (Buchner, 1995, says 40), and Zhukov's tanks and motorised infantry had reached a depth of 40 km. The foot slogging infantry had to drag themselves and their equipment through the soaked earth, fighting isolated pockets of Germans as they advanced. By noon of 7 Mar the right wing of the Fourth Panzer Army had been pushed back to the Seret river, and some Russian troops had crossed. By the evening of the same day (7 Mar) three Soviet armies (60th, 3rd Guards Tank and 4th Tank) were closing on the line from Tarnopol to Chernyi-Ostrov. When tanks captured Volochisk, halfway between Tarnopol and Cheryni-Ostrov, they also cut the Lvov-Odessa railway line. German reinforcements stiffened resistance near the railway line in the Tarnopol-Proskurov sector, so Zhukov ordered Tarnopol bypassed to the south, thus cutting off the German garrison in the town.

First Encirclement (9-20 Mar 1944)

On 9 Mar Russian tanks and infantry broke into the Tarnopol (Buchner, 1995). German reinforcements, including anti-tank guns and assault guns, entered the town and rear echelon troops and civilians fled west. In heavy fighting the reinforced garrison had cleared the town of Russian troops by 11 Mar. Tarnopol, however, remained under continuous bombardment.


Meanwhile, and despite its weak garrison and poor defences, on 10 Mar 1944 Hitler declared Tarnopol the first "Fortified Place" (Buchner, 1995). As such it was to form a breakwater in the Soviet tide. The idea being that the garrison would remain in place while the Russians surrounded the town, thus tying up resources and hopefully delaying the Russian advance westward. With orders to hold on to the last man, the new commander, Generalmajor von Neindorff, organised the defence into four sectors: North, South, East and West (the Kutkowce and Zagrobela suburbs across the Seret). The troops dug in as best they could with the assault guns held in reserve for counter attacks.

Red Army soldiers examine a German Panther tank.Outskirts of Ternopil. April 1944

In the period 13-20 Mar, the reinforced XXXXVIII Panzer Corps attacked southeast of Tarnopol with some success (Buchner, 1995). They closed the gap with First Panzer Army and opened up the route to Tarnopol.

Kamenets-Podolskii Pocket (21 Mar - 7 Apr 1944)

On 21 Mar, with Koniev across the Dniester, Zhukov initiated the next step in his plan - a thrust toward Chernovitsy to encircle First Panzer Army (Buchner, 1995; Erickson, 1996). Zhukov's forces roared along the valley of Zbruch to the Dniester crossing at Zaleshchiki. German resistance was flattened and by 27 Mar Zhukov's advance elements were close to Chernovitsy. Vinnitsa was also taken. By 28 Mar Koniev's and Zhukov's forces met up and some 200,000 men of First Panzer Army were encircled in the Kamenets-Podolskii sector south-west of Vinnitsa. The cordon was only loosely held and First Panzer began fighting its way westward. On 4 Apr two SS Panzer divisions tried to break the circle from the outside, at Podgaitsy. Their opponents fell back to Buchach, where on 7 Apr the SS relief force met the badly mauled First Panzer coming westward. Fighting continued north of Buchach to mid-April but First Panzer Army was saved.

Second Encirclement (23 - 24 Mar 1944)

The Russians advance towards Tarnapol

During 21-24 Mar the Soviet 60th Army (11 rifle divisions, 1 artillery division and IV Guards Tank Corps) drove XXXXVIII Panzer Corps back to the Wosuzka River (Buchner, 1995). By 23 Mar Tarnopol was surrounded for the second and final time. Tarnopol was now 20 km behind Russian lines.

Russian attacks on Tarnopol also resumed on 23 Mar (Buchner, 1995). Tanks and infantry attacked from the north, south and east, but the defenders managed to fend the Russians off. The attacks continued the next day (24 Mar) but now included assaults on the western sector across the Seret as well. Both western suburbs were lost, Kutkowce permanently, but Zagrobela changed hands several times during the day and ended up in German control. Despite the relative lack of success of their attacks, by the evening of 24 Mar the Russians had four Rifle Divisions plus tanks, artillery and rocket launchers in place around the town.


Panzerverband Friebe to the rescue (25 Mar 1944)

At 0430 hours on 25 Mar Oberst Friebe set out with an armoured battle group from 8th Panzer Division to break through to Tarnopol (Buchner, 1995). Friebe had the 2nd and 10th Panzer Regiments (including a Panther Battalion which led the way), and two half track mounted battalions of Panzer Grenadiers (1st Battalion from 8th Panzergrenadier Regiment and 1st Battalion from 74th Panzergrenadier Regiment). The battle group had to advance through mud, under artillery fire, across the Dolzanca River and then over three rows of hills, each with entrenched Russians. When the tanks stalled in front of defensive positions the Panzergrenadiers dismounted to clear them. By late afternoon the battle group managed to push through three Russians positions before reaching a fourth in woods 4 km west of Zagrobela. Under pressure from concealed anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles, artillery, mortars, and ground support aircraft, Friebe decided his men could go no further and withdrew to regroup for an advance to the southeast. This second advance never happened as further casualties and the resulting confusion forced the battle group back to the German lines.

Red Army soldiers rest during a lull in the fighting

Withdrawal to edge of city (25 - 30 Mar 1944)

This relief attempt in fact brought no relief as the Russians continued to press Tarnopol on 25 Mar even as Friebe approached (Buchner, 1995). A Russian regiment deeply penetrated the eastern sector and was only evicted after much heavy fighting. During the evening the Germans in the northern sector saw off an attack by 17 tanks and escorting infantry. Simultaneously the defenders of Zagrobela in the west were mauled by a ferocious attack.

In the period 25-27 Mar the defenders could also see a steady flow of Russian reinforcements arriving, particularly in the west where the relief effort was foreseen (Buchner, 1995). The garrison experienced continuous artillery and mortar bombardment. Russian reconnaissance missions were frequent and increasing in number.

The next Russian attack began on 28 Mar with a 2 hour bombardment (Buchner, 1995). A Russian Rifle Division, supported by tanks, artillery and close support aircraft soon followed, attacking the young soldiers of 949th Grenadier Regiment in the south-eastern sector. The 2nd Battalion broke and was heavily mauled. Counter-attacks could not evict the Russians.

On 29 Mar another German counter-attack failed to pinch off the Russian penetration in the southeast and the defenders were forced to withdraw to the edge of the city (Buchner, 1995). The same day the Russians penetrated positions of the 949th Grenadier Regiment along Access Road IV.

Russian soldiers pose against the destroyed Ternopil Fort

Shortening the perimeter (31 Mar - 9 Apr 1944)

Fighting continued but the next major Russian effort was on 31 Mar (Buchner, 1995). After several hours of bombardment strong Russian forces attacked between the two Railway lines in the east. They broke through the defensive positions and pushed as far as the Rail Station. In the absence of reserves the defenders in the north and south were withdrawn to the town edge. By now the garrison was squeezed into a pocked 1 x 1.5 km, and was entirely within the confines of the town. Continuous heavy shelling resulted in the destruction of most of the town. The fighting had devolved into typical urban combat with small groups fighting for every street and house. Moniushko (2005), who passed through a couple of months later, said the Germans had converted the well built brick houses into pill-boxes.

BRUTAL WAR...

On April 5 the Soviets blanketed the city with fire from heavy batteries and aircraft showered the defenders with bombs. Nevertheless, the infantry assault which followed the bombardment was stopped. Afterward the Soviet infantry pulled back again, allowing their artillery to resume its bombardment of the city. The tightly-stretched German defensive ring held out against several subsequent attacks. This day was the most difficult so far in the fourteen-day siege, and German casualties were very high. Probably as a result of the astonishing German resistance, the next day did not see a resumption by the Soviets of their concentric attacks

In the first two days of April fighting was particularly heavy in the west and east-southeast (Buchner, 1995). On 1 Apr the Russians penetrated the positions of the veteran Demba Fusilier Battalion in the western suburb of Zagrobela. On 2 Apr the Demba Fusilier Battalion cleared the penetration and drove off two subsequent Russians attacks (infantry supported by tanks). The defenders were less successful elsewhere, being driven back in the east and southeast. The last German reserves were use to blunt a Russian push towards the centre of the town. 10 Russian tanks were destroyed in the process. On 3 Apr the Russians tried and failed again. By this stage Stuka dive bombers were acting as flying artillery, hitting Russian troop concentrations around the town. On 4 Apr the Russians attacked again, forcing the defenders to shorten their perimeter again. On 5 Apr several more Russian assaults was repulsed. On 6-8 Apr there was some respite with the Russians contenting themselves to small raids.


A murderous struggle had begun, in which every officer and man was in the front lines. Soldiers young and old fought with the courage of desperation. Elements of the 949th Grenadier Regiment, which had failed several days earlier, were now fighting well, and received the full recognition of the commandant.

German prepare to attack and relieve those trapped at Tarnapol. April 1944

BRUTAL WAR....

Over the city itself hung a black, brown and gray cloud deck. Fiery flashes shot from the fountains of smoke and dust which marked the points of impact of incoming artillery rounds. The air was filled with thundering, crashing and roaring sounds.Flames leapt high into the air, houses collapsed and walls crashed to the ground.Projectiles howled and whistled in from all sides from Soviet heavy mortars, from 76.2mm "Ratschbum" all-purpose guns, 122mm and 172mm heavy guns and from"Stalin Organ" rocket launchers. Street and house fighting raged in every corner and end of the city. Troops of the Red Army, clad in their earth-brown uniforms,charged with shouts of  "Urray!", firing their sub machine-guns, rapid-firing rifles,anti-tank rifles and light machine-guns and throwing hand grenades. They worked their way forward over piles of rubble and through tangled beams, many of them falling under the hammering defensive fire. Ever-smaller groups of German defenders held on bitterly, fighting for every street, every block of houses and every shattered building. The infantry barricaded themselves in the stout stone buildings, firing from windows, cellars and holes in the roofs. German anti-tank guns dug into the rubble fired until they had no more ammunition. The few assault guns and self-propelled guns still left rumbled through the rubble-filled, deserted streets, responding to enemy breakthroughs with immediate counterattacks.Groups of Russians which succeeded in infiltrating the German lines were flushed out and driven back with hand grenades and small arms. Some barricaded themselves inside houses, which were blown up. But the Russians kept coming,smoking out the German nests of resistance with incendiary shells and flamethrowers.


On 9 Apr the four surrounding Russians divisions attacked in unison after a bombardment lasting several hours (Buchner, 1995). The defenders succeeded in seeing off the attacks in the north and west, but had to shorten their lines to cope with Russian penetrations in the east and south. The Russians used direct fire from anti-tank guns, light artillery and the massive SU-152 assault guns ( Moniushko, 2005) to destroy the German strong points.

The Germans tried to relieve Tarnopol but in vain

Panzerverband Friebe tries again (11 - 16 Apr 1944)

On 11 Apr the second relief attempt set out (Buchner, 1995). Once again Oberst Friebe set out with his armoured battle group (Panzerverband), but this time the 9th SS-Panzer Division Hohenstaufen was in support. Panzerverband Friebe stalled in the face of strong defensive fire and Hohenstaufen was delayed at at the Wosuszka river. It took until the morning of 14 Apr for pioneers of the division to put a bridge across the river. Friebe led 71 tanks and 27 assault guns toward Tarnopol but the going was still slow. They took Chodaczow Wielki on the evening on 15 Apr, only 9 km from their starting point. There they had to wait for air dropped supplies before continuing on the 16th. By then it was too late.

Last stand (11 - 16 Apr 1944)

As with the earlier relief attempt, the Germans efforts did not stop the Russians from exerting pressure on Tarnopol itself (Buchner, 1995; note, Buchner seems to get confused about dates from this point in the narrative and consistently says March when April is intended). The Russians achieved several penetrations on 11 Apr, which the defenders managed to seal off. The Germans could not, however, deal with the major attack launched on the night of 11-12 Apr. On 13 Apr a Russian attack from the south split Zagrobela in the west from the main position in the centre of the town. On the night of 13-14 Apr most of the garrison moved across to Zagrobela as a prelude to a breakout. They had 1,300 men, one tank, two assault guns, two self-propelled guns, one anti-tank gun and two light infantry guns. Another 200 men, divided into small groups, remained in the east to delay the enemy, but were pushed out on the night of 14-15 Apr.

Generalmajor von Neindorff still firmly believed that the relief attack was well under way, but his radio messages requesting help and information as to the progress of the attack were becoming ever more desperate.These messages are typical:
April 12, 2125: Situation extremely desperate, penetrations can no longer be cleared up, contact lost between units. Serious consequences be expected from further enemy pressure. Relief imperative before it is too late.
April 13, 0650: All sectors under heavy pressure through the entire night. New penetration northern wing. Hemmed in further in west,pressure from north toward the bridge.
At 0905: Garrison under pounding in ruins since
At 0700. Enemy tanks and anti-tank guns in the streets, as well preparatory artillery and mortar fire.
At 1255: Heavy barrages on entire defensive perimeter since 1000.Infantry attacks in the south. Critical situation urgently requires relief.
At 1520: House-to-house fighting in the south and east. Ammunition running low. Where is relief?

The Russians continued to shell, bomb, and strafe the remaining Germans clustered into a 1 km square centred on semi rural Zagrobela (Buchner, 1995). Ground attacks were also launched and at noon on 15 Apr the pocket radioed to say their commander had died in close quarter fighting.


At noon on March 15 came the last radio message from the Zagrobela pocket. It reported the death of the commandant. Generalmajor  von Neindorff had fallen in close-quarters fighting.

Another relief attack — the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North Ukraine, Feldmarschall Model (in background, left) accompanied the attack in the leading half-track.

Following the death of Generalmajor  von Neindorff, Oberst von Schönfeld assumed command of the remains of the garrison now squeezed into Zagrobela.There were about 1,500 men, but the situation in Zagrobela was hopeless from the beginning. It was a pocket about 1,000 meters in diameter in an area surrounding the open, village-like residential area. There was next to no cover available, and the area was under constant bombardment from Soviet heavy weapons and was subjected to waves of bombing and strafing attacks from the air. Since most of the houses there were made of clay or wood with no cellars, losses mounted extremely quickly. The wounded were placed in the few available cellars. For the worn-out,exhausted, battered German soldiers, with their bearded, smoke-blackened, emaciated faces, and their sad eyes, the situation in the cover less terrain was catastrophic. Rations, which had been relatively plentiful in Ternopol, now began to run short, as only the most vital things had been brought over from the city. Worst of all, there was scarcely any water. The single well was under enemy fire day and night until it was completely destroyed. The troops suffered from the shortage of drinking water, the wounded worst of all. All that could be done was to wet their lips with vodka; there was no way to get water for the new wounded. Moreover,ammunition was running out and the last radio had been put out of action.


Breakout (16 - 18 Apr 1944)

At 0200 hours on 16 Mar the survivors that were still mobile attempted to break out (Buchner, 1995). Taking the Russians by surprise they managed to break through the inner ring relatively easily. At this point they divided into two groups of about 700 men. One group headed west and the other southwest. The latter group crossed the hills southwest of Zagrobela, into a wood south of the village of Janovka. There they eliminated some Russian anti-tank gun and artillery emplacements, however, under being attacked from flanks and rear they were pushed out of the forest toward the west. By this stage all the officers had been killed. The survivors formed small groups and tried to break through, but only 43 reached the German armour at Chodaczow on 17 Apr. Little is known of the fate of the other group, however, on the morning of 16 Apr five men managed to reach the positions of the 357th Infantry Division north of Kozlov. Two more men appeared north of Kozlov on 18 Apr. Finally five prisoners were returned to Germans lines for propaganda purposes. That made a total of 55 who reach safety out of the original 4,600 men.

The attempt to save Tarnopol

At its peak the garrison had 4,600 men (Buchner, 1995). This included quite a range of types including under trained youths, older militiamen, volunteers, Waffen-SS troops, and regular soldiers. They were short of ammunition, in particular for artillery and heavy weapons. After reinforcements the garrison comprised:

The Germans At Tarnapol

Fortress Commandant with Staff (Generalmajor von Neindorff)
Two battalions of the 949th Grenadier Regiment (from 359th Infantry Division) - young soldiers with cursory training.
Demba Fusilier Battalion (a veteran unit)
543rd Regional Defence Battalion
500th Proving Battalion
Mitscherling Battalion (3rd Battalion, 4th SS-Volunteer Regiment, from Galizien Division)
The remnants of 3rd Battalion, 4th SS-Volunteer Regiment (from Galizien Division) in company strength
Kampfgruppe Grundmann (company strength)
Alert Company (from elements of the 8th Panzer Division)
Alert Company Vogel
4th Battalion, 359th Artillery Regiment with 3 Batteries
3 x 10.5 cm guns
8 x 15.0 cm guns
1 x battery of assault guns with 9 assault guns
1 x anti-tank company with 6 guns *
1 x Self-propelled artillery battery of the "LAH" with 6 guns
Remnants of 4th Battery, 384th Flak Battalion
3 x 2.0 cm anti-aircraft guns
4 x 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns
Other small units
* The total complement of anti-tank guns for the entire garrison was 15, including some outdated 3.7 cm Pak 35/36. It is probable that the nine unaccounted for anti-tank guns were part of infantry battalions.

It is possible it was the Soviet 13th Army around Tarnopol as this unit was assigned the task to push westward whilst the rest of the Front moved south ( Moniushko, 2005)

Only a few surviving German soldiers appeared in the morning mist East of Chodaczow-Wielki

References

Buchner, A. (1995). Ostfront 1944: The German Defensive Battles on the Russian Front 1944 [D. Johnston Trans.]. PA: Schiffer.

Erickson, J. (1996). The Road to Berlin: Stalin's war with Germany: Volume Two. Phoenix Giants.

Moniushko, E. D. (2005). From Leningrad to Hungary: Notes of a Red Army soldier, 1941-1946 (O. Sheremaet, Trans; D. M. Glantz, Ed.). Frank Cass.

Downfall: Slow Decimation Of The German Army: Battle Of KORSUN-CHERKASSY

1944. The slow decimation of the German Army gained momentum. Battle of Korsun. Or Battle of Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket. Most westerners have not heard of it unless they are history aficionados. The Battle was huge. It could have turned into another Stalingrad. Two thirds of the Wehrmacht trapped in the pocket managed to escape. The rest were killed or captured. Two corps ceased to exist. It was war at its most brutal. Two armies. Equally tough and ruthless. But the Wehrmacht was on the run. In decline.

It was war at its most brutal. Read on....

IMPORTANCE OF KORSUN-CHERKASSY BATTLE

Virtually unknown in the English-speaking world, the Battle of Cherkassy (also known as the Korsun Pocket) still stirs controversy in both the former Soviet Union and in Germany, the protagonists during this epic struggle. Although small in scale when compared to the gigantic battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk, theBattle of the Cherkassy Pocket occupies a prominent place in the Russo-German War. It was at Cherkassy where the last German offensive strength in the Ukraine was drained away, creating the conditions for the victorious Soviet advance into Poland, Rumania, and the Balkans during the summer and autumn of 1944. Eclipsed by a war of such gigantic proportions that saw battles of over one million men or more as commonplace, the events which occurred along the banks of the Gniloy Tickich have faded into obscurity. However, to the 60,000 German soldiers who were encircled there at the end of January 1944, this was perhaps one of the most brutal, physically exhausting, and morally demanding battles they had ever experienced. Fully thirty-four percent of them would not escape....

Wiking Waffen SS Division breaks out of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket 

CRUCIAL BATTLES OF 1944 ON THE EASTERN FRONT

The fate of the German Sixth Army surrounded in Stalingrad was decided in early 1943, marking the turning point in the eastern campaign. From then on the German forces were steadily on the retreat in the face of continual Soviet offensives.

As 1944 began, the superiority of the Red Army had become so crushing, aided by the obstinacy at the highest levels of German command, that the German Eastern Front, which was under heavy pressure everywhere, suffered a number of disasters which cost the eastern armies alone more than half a million German soldiers killed, missing and wounded. 

It began with the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket, where two corps were smashed. Then followed the end of the German forces defending Ternopol, the belated evacuation of the Crimea, the destruction of Army Group Center, the failed breakout of an entire army corps from the encirclement near Brody and the collapse of the entire Army Group South-Ukraine in Romania. 

The hundreds of thousands of German soldiers who had to endure this fate were symbols of distress, suffering, sacrifice and death, of fulfillment of duty, courage and comradeship, as well as of fear, desperation and self-sacrifice. It borders on the miraculous that the German soldier continued to stand and hold out despite these bitter setbacks of such enormous proportions. 

Cherkassy and Ternopol, Crimea and Sevastopol, Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk, Brody, Jassy and Vutcani entered the history of the Second World War as beacons in a pitiless struggle with tragic results.

From Ostfront 1944: The German Defensive Battles on the Russian Front 1944 (Schiffer military history)

By ALEX BUCHNER

MASSACRE AT KORSUN

Stalin demanded the speedy "liquidation" of the German forces trapped at Korsun before relief could arrive. General Werner Stemmermann and his remaining units determined on a final breakout. At 0200 hours on 17 February, as a blizzard raged, Stemmermann's troops finished their last supplies and destroyed guns and lorries, leaving scenes like this one. There was no place in the columns for the wounded, who were killed where they lay. As the German column moved into open country, Soviet tanks charged straight into it and Cossacks hunted down and massacred fleeing Germans

A painting depicting the Russians attacking the encircled Germans in Korsun-Cherkassy

Under the yellow sky of early morning and over ground covered with wet snow Soviet tanks made straight for the thick of the column, ploughing up and down, killing and crushing with their tracks. Almost simultaneously massed Cossack cavalry wheeled away from the tanks to hunt down and massacre men fleeing for the refuge of the hills: hands held high in surrender the Cossacks sliced off with their sabres. The killing in this human hunt went on for several hours and a new round opened on the banks of the river Gniloy Tikich, where the survivors of the first collision of the German column with Soviet troops dragged and fought their way. — John Erickson, in The Road to Berlin, p. 178.

German soldiers who were lucky to be alive and taken prisoner

KORSUN: THE SITUATION
http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/battles/battleskorsunpocket.htm

During the Russian winter offensive of 1943-44, the German defences on the middle Dnepr had collapsed under enormous enemy pressure. The Russians had forced crossings of the river and continued their advance westward. Only at one point, the 80-mile wide salient between Kanev and Cherkassy, were German forces still holding on to their defensive positions along the western bank of the river. 

The German forces in the salient, part of 8th Army, consisted of two Corps, the 11th and 42nd. These two Corps included the 57th, 88th, 72nd, parts of the 389th Infantry Divisions and the 5th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Wiking. In addition was the Korpsabteilung B, made up from parts of the 258th Regiment and the 112th Infantry division, plus various armoured and other supporting units. An airfield at Korsun also provided the possibility that any units that might become trapped could be re-supplied by air. 

Despite this, Field Marshal Von Manstein, commander of Army Group South, had requested repeatedly that the two Corps be allowed to withdraw from the salient in order to straighten the German line. However Hitler refused, ordering that the salient be held, despite the risk of encirclement. He proposed that once the Russian offensive had been halted, it would be used as a springboard for an offensive to recapture Kiev. 

Stavka saw the opportunity that an encirclement of the forces in the salient provided. Not only would it enable the destruction of a large part of the German 8th Army, but even more appealing was the idea that any retreat by Army Group South could lead to another major German force, Army Group A, being cut off further to the south in the Crimea. To achieve these goals, the Ukrainian Front Group, led by Generals Konev and Vatutin were tasked to attack the flanks of the salient, from the southeast and northwest. Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front consisted of the 1st and 6th Tank and 40th Armies, while Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front consisted of the 5th Tank and 4th and 53rd Armies. The 27th and 52nd Armies would press the northern and eastern faces of the salient along the Dnepr river positions.

The Germans lost a lot of war material which was destroyed

TRAPPED!

The two Ukrainian Front Groups began their attempt to encircle the German forces in the salient on the 24th of January 1944. The forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which attacked from the southeast and drove along the southern side of the salient, made excellent progress, severing the link between the 11th and 42nd Corps and the remainder of the 8th Army. 

Meanwhile the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked from the northwest and drove down the western flank of the salient. The German 7th Corps took the brunt of the attack and crumbled under the onslaught. The 88th and 198th Divisions fought desperately against the Russian tanks. These units, with little armoured support, were the only forces available to hold the line. If they failed to do so, the path lay open towards the 5th Tank Army, less than 90km to the southeast. If the two forces were able to link up, the salient would be cut off and the pocket closed. 

This was achieved on February the 28th, near Zvenigorodka, when elements of the 6th Tank Army and the 5th Tank Army linked up near the town. The fate of 57,000 German soldiers trapped in the 'Korsun Pocket' now hung in the balance. Following the closure of the pocket, command of the entire force passed to General Wilhelm Stemmerman and the force within became known as Group Stemmerman. The most rational solution would have been to attempt an immediate breakout, before the encirclement could be secured. In addition to saving the men trapped in the pocket, the void now created between the 1st Panzer Army on the left and the remainder of the 8th Army on the right could be filled. 

However Hitler forbade this and ordered that Group Stemmerman hold firm in the pocket. Hitler saw an opportunity to encircle the Russian forces that surrounded the pocket and destroy them, convinced that they were considerably weakened. However the units ordered to carry out this encirclement were at half strength or less, except for the recently arrived 22nd Panzer Division, and even their equipment was badly in need of repair. The German logistical situation was perilous, with men and materials in short supply. Following the debilitating Russian winter offensive, this was compounded by poor ground conditions, constant Russian air attacks on convoys and frequent partisan attacks. German moral was also at a very low ebb. In addition the first week in February saw an early warming of the weather, which proved disastrous to the movement of the German forces.

ATTEMPTS TO SAVE 

On the morning of February 4th, General Breith initiated the attack against the Russian forces surrounding the pocket, thrusting from the south with the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions. However the attack coincided with the start of the dreaded 'rasputitsa' or spring thaw. Movement, where possible at all, was slowed to a crawl and the advance soon became bogged down. To the south of Medvin, the tanks of Oberstleutnant Bake's Heavy Panzer Regiment led the way, with the 34th and 198th Infantry Divisions protecting their flanks. Bake's panzers slowly managed to advance only six miles, against heavy resistance and atrocious ground conditions. Throughout a day of heavy fighting, both sides suffered loss, but the Russians held their ground and the panzers could get no closer.

General Breith though, refused to give up. With parts of the SS LAH Division on hand and the advance elements of the 1st Panzer Division now arriving, he committed them to the action. He radioed the forces in the pocket with the simple message, 'I'm coming!' On the 8th of February the 1st Panzer Division captured Bushanka. Finally, on February the 8th, the Russians were forced into a withdrawal back over the Gniloy Tikich River where the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions were able to establish a small bridgehead. However poor ground conditions and stiff Russian resistance halted any further advance there. The German forces trapped in the Korsun pocket would have to fight their way out to them.

On the 12th of February, the SS LAH Division battled against Russian forces at Vinograd, while the 16th Panzer Division encountered resistance on the road to Medvin. The 17th Panzer Division also became engaged in a tank battle against elements of the Russian 6th Tank Army to the southwest of Medvin. The 1st Panzer Division meanwhile, continued to press its attack towards Lysianka. Further north, elements of the 47th Panzer Corps stalled at Zvenigorodka, 30km from the pocket and 25km from the 3rd Panzer Corps, its strength expended.

Dead German soldiers who were massacred when they tried to break out

General Stemmerman quickly realized the seriousness of the situation. Only quick and decisive action could save the situation from becoming a major disaster. The forces in the pocket would have to be rescued soon, but first the pocket would have to hold firm. To accomplish this, the establishment of new fronts was initiated at possible breakout points, mostly along the southern edge of the pocket. 

Initially most of the German forces were facing north and east, along the Dnepr River. Units would have to be repositioned to secure the perimeter of the pocket. Orders were received from 8th Army, 'Group Stemmerman will shorten the front lines and move the pocket in the direction of Shenderovka in order to be able, when the time comes, to break out towards the forces mounting a relief attack from outside.' This would require a masterful handling of the forces within the pocket. Stemmerman took on the task with a vengeance and successfully contracted the northern edge of the pocket, with 42nd Corps abandoning the Dnepr River positions. At the same time, the pocket was extended to the south by 11th Corps, with the objective of capturing the key villages of Shenderovka, Novaya-Buda and Komarovka. 

The focal point of all activity was Korsun, which lay in the centre of the pocket and provided the pocket's only airfield. Here supplies were flown in and casualties flown out, by up to 70 aircraft per day, as the weather permitted. It was the only contact that the German forces had with the outside of the pocket, with the exception of radio communications.

A dead German soldier in the snow

THE POCKET MOVES FROM KORSUN TO SHENDEROVKA

At Novaya-Buda the severely weakened 105th Regiment of the 72nd Division was tasked with assaulting the village. The Regimental commander, Major Kaestner, knowing he would have to cross an open slope to reach his objective, chose to make a night attack. The attack was made on the night of February 11th. Moving silently with bayonets, knives and entrenching tools, the men of the 105th crept toward the Russian positions. They could hear enemy soldiers chatting and an occasional burst of laughter. Suddenly, they were challenged by a Russian sentry. The regiment charged the surprised enemy, firing as they ran. Fighting was fierce as shock troops roved up and down the trenches finishing what remained of the Russian resistance. On the 12th of February, Korsun was abandoned, along with its precious airfield. Almost 3000 wounded men were left behind there with medics to await capture by the Russians. No further supplies were received or wounded airlifted out after this date. On the 13th, inside the pocket, the 105th Regiment took 240 prisoners and destroyed 21 tanks in an assault on the village of Komarovka, but suffered heavy losses maintaining control of the town. The village of Shenderovka was taken later that afternoon, securing the planned breakout area.

By February 15th, the pocket had moved with a masterful fluidity, maintaining its flanks against constant Russian pressure, not only from the pursuing ground forces but also from constant air attacks, to the jump-off point at Shenderovka. The same day, the 105th Regiment captured the village of Chilki, and then repulsed heavy Russian counter-attacks. The pocket was now centred on the village of Shenderovka and had been reduced to an area of 56sq km, containing around 40,000 men.

German POW after the Battle of Korsun

On the 15th of February, Panzers from the 3rd Panzer Corps made one last push from their bridgehead on the Gniloy Tikich, to capture Hill 239, northwest of the river. The area of the hill was held by elements from the 6th Tank and 27th Armies. But by this time the Russians had prepared strong defensive positions and were continually being reinforced. 

Despite their best efforts the tanks of the 1st and 17th Panzer Divisions were unable to capture the hill, their advance grinding to halt along a line formed by the towns of Lysianka, Oktyabr and Chishintsy, about 12km short of the objective. This meant that the men trapped in the pocket would have to fight their way out against Russian infantry supported by armour, in well prepared positions. The Russians occupied two sets of positions, the inner ring facing Group Stemmerman and an outer ring that was holding off the 3rd Panzer Corps efforts to break through. 

On the same day 8th Army issued new orders to the forces trapped in the pocket, 'Group Stemmerman must perform a breakthrough as far as Zhurzintsy/Hill 239 by its own effort. There it will link up with the 3rd Panzer Corps.' However the message did not clarify that Hill 239 was still in Russian hands. Stemmerman concluded from the message that friendly forces held the hill. He immediately began preparations for the breakout. Stemmerman would remain with the rearguard troops and General Lieb would lead the breakout. Once it began, however, there would be little communication between units. Local commanders retained strong discipline among individual units.

THE BREAKOUT

By the 16th of February, the besieged forces of Group Stemmerman had been under siege for almost three weeks and the situation was becoming more desperate with each passing day. Fearing that Hitler might postpone the breakout and knowing of the steadily weakening condition of the forces inside the pocket, Von Manstein made the decision to order General Stemmerman to begin the breakout attempt. The codeword was Watchword Freedom. His communiqué stated simply, 'Watchword Freedom, objective Lysianka, 2300 hours.' After issuing the order to break out, Manstein had attempted to warn Stemmerman that Hill 239 was still in enemy hands. But all radios had been destroyed and there was no further communication with the trapped troops.

Within minutes, Stemmerman's chief of staff, Colonel Franz, had read the message. The entire force was advised and the battle plan for the breakout, involving a three-pronged attack by the group, was put into action. To the northwest, Corps Detachment B would lead the right wing of the breakout. In the centre, the 105th Regiment would again lead the way. Their success at Novaya-Buda had earned them the respect of the entire group. The southwestern effort would be lead by elements of the 5th SS Wiking Division. General Stemmerman would remain with the covering forces and control the withdrawal. All unnecessary items of heavy equipment were left behind.

At 03:30 hours the breakout commenced. The 105th Regiment moved silently in the darkness until they reached the base of Hill 239. A reconnaissance patrol led by Lieutenant Bender moved ahead to scout out the area. It was hoped that he would make contact with units of the 1st Panzer Division. However Lieutenant Bender soon returned with grim news. 'There are tanks ahead, but not ours. A half dozen T-34s are stationed on the road ahead and there are more further to the west.' The way was not open after all and the lead units realised that they would have to fight through the Russian positions before reaching the safety of 1st Panzers positions. 

Major Kaestner reorganized his force and readied them for a swift assault. Kaestner's men moved silently towards the Russian position once again. Again they assaulted with bayonets, knives and entrenching tools. The Russian infantry fled firing wildly into the darkness. However this only alerted the tank commanders who quickly turned on their vehicle searchlights, illuminating the fleeing mass of German troops. Now there was no orderly movement, it was every man for himself. All along the line the German units moved frantically ahead, suffering horrendous casualties. They had no choice but to move forward. The units of the 1st Panzer Division and Bake's Heavy Regiment, hearing the carnage moved forward to offer what help they could. All that remained of the 105th Regiment, about 220 men from an original compliment of 1100, finally reached their rescuers at Lysianka. Loudly shouting the password, 'Freedom, freedom!' they were greeted by Lieutenant Freiherr von Dornberg, who welcomed Kaestner with an embrace. Meanwhile A renewed Russian attack on the German rear was repulsed by the 5th Panzer regiment of the Wiking division, which was itself completely destroyed in the process. 

During the day General Stemmerman had been killed by anti-tank fire as he attempted to change command posts and General Lieb had assumed command. Leon Degrell, serving with the Wallonian Brigade, part of the SS Wiking Division, described the ensuing panic. 'In a frantic race to escape, some carts carrying the wounded overturned. Suddenly a column of Russian tanks appeared and drove over the carts, smashing them one by one like boxes of matches. They machine gunned the horses and ran over the wounded crushing them beneath their tracks.'

The relief attempt begins. Tanks and halftracks of 1st Panzer Division begin movements towards the pocket, early February 1944

Amongst the chaos, men from the 3rd Company of the 389th Panzerjaeger Battalion, saw the calamity unfolding. Staff Sergeant Krause who was leading the Company ordered his men into action. They moved quickly to the top of a nearby hill with some panzerfausts, finding seven T-34's firing down on the columns. They fired at the nearest vehicles, destroying two of them. The remaining vehicles, unable to see where the attack had come from, panicked and moved away. 

Elsewhere a column from the Wiking Division was under attack from Russian tanks when a roaring cheer was heard. To the columns amazement, an officer on horseback appeared from a nearby ravine leading a force of some 3000 men. The man on horseback was Lieutenant Colonel Muller, waving his men forward as they smashed into the Russian lines. Even though dozens fell to concentrated gunfire the enemy line was broken and moved away. The men that were left moved on into the woods and headed toward the river. Colonel Franz had witnessed the slaughter of the wounded of the Wiking Division and had a horse shot out from under him during the melee. 

Proceeding on foot, he joined up with another group of soldiers and moved with them. Suddenly rifle and machine gun fire broke out in front of them. Two soldiers of the Wallonian Brigade appeared. They warned of a Russian machine gun position blocking the way in front of them. Franz quickly grabbed a sniper rifle and moved forward towards the enemy position. With his telescopic sight, the Colonel sighted three enemy soldiers manning a machine gun. Taking quick aim, he snapped off three shots, killing them all. Franz stood, and waved the remainder of his group forward.

Tiger tanks of the 3rd Panzer Corps. Korsun-Cherkassy. February 1944

CROSSING THE GNILOY TIKICH RIVER

By late morning, the escaping troops of Group Stemmerman had reached the bank of the Gniloy Tikich River. The early thaw had raised the level of the river and increased its flow into a roaring torrent, which now blocked their way. The waterway was 30 yards wide and about six feet deep. There was no bridge to be seen and crossing it seemed impossible. Unknown to the group, about a mile to the northwest, the 1st Panzer division had a bridge under their control and the engineers of the Jena Armoured Engineer Battalion had also erected a smaller footbridge. 

As the first arrivals milled around the river, the first T-34's appeared in the distance. Firing high-explosive shells and ricocheting airbursts, they caused panic. For many, the choice was clear. They would either have to brave the strong current or die where they stood. Whole groups of men jumped in and began to try to cross. Many were swept away by the current, or dragged under by the weight of their uniforms and drowned. Men began to strip in order to improve their chances of survival. However those who reached the other side were suffering terribly from the cold, the temperature that morning was -5°C. The men still had over a mile to walk through the snow before they reached the safety of the German lines. 

Some units attempted the crossing in some semblance of order. General Herbert Gille, commander of the Wiking Division, ordered that a tractor be driven into the middle of the river to act as a temporary pier, but the tractor was soon swept away. He then organised human chains, alternating a swimmer and a non-swimmer to extend across the river. It worked well until the numbing effects of the water caused a man to lose his grip. Suddenly the chain was broken and the surging currents carried the men away. 

Once the first survivors reached the first positions of the LAH and 1st Panzer Divisions, they realized the desperate situation unfolding to their south. One group on the other side of the river moved to help in bringing some of the refugees to the crossings to their north. A group of tanks and engineers immediately went to the crossing site further south to assist their fellow soldiers. The crossings continued throughout the day. Rear guard units of the Group pulled out successfully and made the crossing. By the end of the 16th, most of the fighting at the river had ended and the majority of the survivors from the pocket were across. The German lines had been straightened and nearly 35,000 of the original 56,000 men were saved. Over 10,000 men were killed and another 17,000 captured.

CONCLUSION

The Russians were now becoming skilled in the execution of the sustained all arms offensive. Their troops were now more experienced and better equipped with simple and effective weaponry. Their overwhelming resources of manpower and determination to rid the Motherland of the hated German invader were beginning to exact a heavy cost on the German army.

The German forces were hampered by Hitler's continual interference. His repeated reluctance to give up ground in order to improve the tactical situation doomed the two Corps trapped in the salient. Hitler's inaccurate view of the situation belied the fact that most of his Divisions were badly under strength, poorly equipped and exhausted.

The Luftwaffe was again unable, as at Stalingrad, to re-supply the forces trapped in the pocket by air. Russian air superiority and a lack of fighters to support the transports lead to heavy losses. Poor ground conditions, as so often during the Russian campaign, badly affected German mobility. This debilitated offensive operations outside the pocket and the ability of the forces inside the pocket to manoeuvre.

While the Russians had not succeeded in destroying the two Corps trapped in the pocket, they had successfully neutralized the fighting ability of over six German divisions. Most of the men rescued had no weapons and all their heavy equipment had been abandoned. German forces had lost their foothold along the Dnepr.

The Russian forces would regroup and prepare for a new offensive during the summer. Operation Bagration, against German Army Group Centre, which would drive the Germans out of Byelorussia.

Germans escaping from the encirclement

SOME NOTES FROM THE POCKET.....

From Ostfront 1944: The German Defensive Battles on the Russian Front 1944 (Schiffer military history)

By ALEX BUCHNER

February 7: In spite of everything, order and discipline reign in the pocket. All movements are carried out calmly and according to plan. Rearguard and flanking cover fight almost to the precise moment of the next withdrawal. Gaps in the front are closed.

February 8: The enemy is attempting to reduce the pocket from all sides.

February 9: Our withdrawals are considerable. The surrounded divisions give up more ground in the southeast, east, north and northeast. The pocket has already shrunk considerably.February 10:Rescue appears ever more questionable. The surrounded units are nearing the end of their strength. There is little ammunition and no regular rations. The men are dead tired and have been completely soaked for days. Even by the most optimistic view the collapse is only a few days away.

February 10/11: The night again passes with numerous, difficult battles, rain and deep, clinging mud.

February 11: At 1100 two very correct Russian officers appear in front of our sector carrying a message from the Soviet High Command to the commander of the surrounded German units. The message is a final ultimatum - either we surrender or the final measures to destroy the pocket will begin at 1300. A prime-mover takes the officers through the mud back to the Russian lines.In the afternoon the enemy attacks from all sides. We must get out of the pocket. When will the order come to break out?

February 12: Despite all their efforts of the last 14 days the Russians have had nosuccess, now they want to accelerate the finishing of the pocket. Aftertheir ultimatum is rejected out of hand begins the assault on all sectors.Once again heavy rain, mud, wet, filth, trenches and holes filledwith water.The pocket has become extremely small, territory will definitelyhave to be won in the south and southwest in the direction of the plannedbreakout.Superhuman efforts are demanded of the troops. Every few minutesthe enemy breaks through the positions somewhere, counterattackshave to be carried out and enemy penetrations sealed off.The field bakeries in Korsun bake the last bran-bread. Togetherwith the small packets of concentrated chocolate dropped with thesupply canisters it is the only rations issued after February 13 ..."

German snipers at Korsun

February 13: A several-kilometer-long lake southeast of Korsun ends in a tremendous dam. The troops evacuating Korsun have to cross the lake overan almost kilometer-long wooden bridge which the pioniers have built along the top of the dam. Everything is going smoothly despite the giant chain of men and vehicles. The cold has set in again and the mud has frozen. Everywhere people are trying to get vehicles going or arepushing them to the side so as not to block the road and hinder the panje wagons which, pulled by small horses and oxen, can get through more easily. 

February 14: The news of our relief advance is totally inaccurate. In the north of the pocket we are withdrawing alarmingly, but scarcely advancing in the south. The Russians, who are staying on the heels of the rearguard, pushed into Korsun early this morning. The village of Novo Buda in thesouth must be held no matter what, it forms the left pillar of the breakout area. If the enemy takes back Novo Buda he will only have to advance 6 kilometers to the west to cut off everyone near Shenderovka.The men in their dirty, mud-covered winter uniforms are totally exhausted. There is almost nothing to eat and only dirty water from the sides of the road to drink. The only heat for warming and drying outcomes from meager fires made from corn husks. Added to this is the mental strain.The weather has changed, the rain has stopped. The wind whistles and the onset of the cold brings snow.

February 15: Shenderovka, the breakout gate, has finally been taken following three days and two nights of fighting. In our rear, on the other hand, the Russians have pushed far beyond Korsun. The worst thing is the rations. We have no more, nothing at all. The last supplies were issued in Korsun. The men, without sleep and shivering from the cold, have received nothing, hot or cold, for threedays, and are living off what they have with them.A collective farm which has been transformed into a field hospitalis hit by fire from a Stalin Organ. Dozens of wounded create a bloody shambles. More than 1,200 wounded have already spent several days and nights in the open in straw-filled, light panje wagons requisitioned from villages in the pocket. After the rain of the previous weeks they have become soaked to the skin; now they must face the biting cold and  lie half-frozen beneath their snow-covered blankets. One scarcely hears any moaning or groaning; many have given up, and no longer ask for anything. As soon as one dies he is laid beside the wagon by the Russian volunteers detailed as drivers and his place is taken by a new casualty.There are no more medicines and dressings are in short supply. The doctors do all that is within their power, but they cannot help many. They do it to satisfy their consciences.In the north the enemy continues to press and is already three kilometers from Shenderovka ..."

German snipers in action

Wednesday, February 16: Shenderovka had become a gate to hell. The way to the assembly areas led every unit through the village with its one through-road, the sole approach road for the first three divisions, all of the train units and the rear-echelon services of both corps. Movement was slow and laborious over the muddy, rutted and worn surface.The endless columns of marching men and motor and horse-drawn vehicles became wedged together, resulting in a tremendous traffic jam. Since the Russian shad a clear view into the pocket and the movements inside could not be concealed,directed artillery fire, as well as fire from heavy mortars and Stalin Organs, fell continuously among the halted and slow-moving masses, inflicting further heavy casualties. Shells and howling rocket projectiles impacted everywhere. The single road was soon blocked by shattered vehicles, dead horses, exploding munitions vehicles, burning trucks, heaps of dead and wounded, shattered remains of walls and burning wooden houses. It was a hellish scene filled with bursting shells,smoke and dust, the cries and moans of the severely wounded, and the roar of German artillery as it fired its last rounds before spiking its guns. Anti-aircraft guns roared as enemy aircraft strafed and bombed the columns. And all the time fresh units continued to move into Shenderovka from the north, east and west. There was no way around the town and the only chance for freedom lay to the southwest

BREAKOUT AND THEN NIGHTMARE....

When morning dawned the men of the break-out force realized to their bitter disappointment, and even horror and dismay, that it was not the tanks of the German relief force which were waiting for them on both sides of Hill 239, but a fully alerted enemy. 

Russian tanks, anti-tank guns and artillery fired into the already confused and exhausted elements of the first wave and the steadily growing stream of approaching columns from the second and third waves.Everything became inextricably entangled, was seized by an unholy disorder and began to disintegrate. Any semblance of command ceased to exist. Horse-drawn vehicles were smashed, horses ran away and bogged-down vehicles went up in smoke and flames. Men ran about seeking cover in the mostly open terrain.Clusters of men ran forward with loud shouts, trying to get through, while others sought refuge in the deep, snow-covered ravines or in clumps of trees. Increasingly heavy fire smashed into the dense masses, which at first stayed put as if stunned and apathetic. Many grenadiers tried to fight back. Apart from Panzerfaust rocket launchers, however, they had no effective weapons against the enemy tanks which appeared everywhere. 

Despite their teams of eight and ten horses the German antitank and light field guns had been left behind on the smooth, icy slopes or had become bogged down. Some Russian tanks were destroyed by the Panzerfaust antitank rockets. Two men of the 389th Anti-tank Battalion, which had long since been without guns, disabled five tanks. The others turned away. However, more tanks appeared and the enemy fire became ever heavier. Until now the troops had dragged all of their heavy weapons along with them, but now they were left behind, light and heavy field guns, as well as mortars and machine-guns. 

The fate of the wounded in the panje wagons was also decided here; they, too, had to be left behind. And the enemy knew no pity. Oberst Franz, Chief-of-Staff of XXXXII Corps, saw about 15 Russian tanks roll through a ravine in which a column of panje wagons carrying wounded had stopped. The Russians shot the horses with machine-guns and crushed the wagons beneath the tracks of their tanks. Of these130 seriously-wounded men of the Wiking Division Dr. Thon was able to rescue perhaps a bare dozen. 

Approximately 140 other seriously-wounded men had been taken along in the division's tracked vehicles. These were shot up by Soviet tanks west of Shenderovka. Doctor Isselstein was killed by fire from a T-34. A column carrying wounded from the Wallonie Brigade also failed to get through, as did several others.

Soviet troops ride a light tank into battle to clean-up the Germans in the Korsun pocket

CROSSING THE RIVER GNILOY TIKICH....

There was no bridge, and there were no boats to be seen anywhere.

In the course of less than half an hour about 20,000 men had assembled at the bank. They had no idea where the leading elements of the relief force were, they were unaware that 

Oberstleutnant Dr. Bäke and his heavy panzer regiment had set out again that morning to relieve the pocket and in the course of the day even reached the fateful Hill 239 south of Dzhurzhentsy, they did not know that German panzer grenadiers were holding Oktyabr to cover their withdrawal", and they did not know that only three kilometers upstream lay Lysyanka, in which the 1stPanzer Division had built a bridge and a footbridge for them. 

They had gone further south then the defenders of the Lysyanka bridgehead could have expected. It was about eleven in the morning. Everyone was deliberating how to cross the stream. Generals Lieb and Gille and Oberst Dr. Hohm arrived and attempted to establish a semblance of order and organize a crossing. A heavy tractor was driven into the river to serve as the basis for a crossing. It was rolled away by the current, however, and other pieces of equipment which had been pushed in behind it were also swept away. The men formed teams of swimmers and non-swimmers, but the non-swimmers were pulled away by the current and went under. Many tried to ride across on horses and were swept downstream, others crawled out onto the ice and went through. Still others took off their uniforms, bundled them up and threw them across to the other side and then tried to swim across, usually in vain. 

The temperature at the time was minus five degrees and the area was being swept by an icy wind.

Then the pursuing Soviet tanks reached the area of the river. The first four T-34s drove to within a few hundred meters and began firing into the masses of men with machine-guns and high-explosive shells. There was no stopping now - they had to get to the other side where the Russians could not follow. Once again the result was a terrifying scene. In groups of thirty to forty, the frozen, half-starved soldiers plunged into the ice-cold water and tried to fight their way through the rushing torrent. Heads and arms poked up between the ice floes, cries for help rang out, bodies of horses and men floated and sank in the current. The Generals, too, were swimming.

Oberst  Dr. Hohn, the commander of the 72nd Infantry Division, waited completely soaked in the freezing cold on the far bank until the last of his men arrived. Still on the other side, however, were the wounded, who could not cross. The entire bank was littered with discarded small arms, items of equipment and parts of uniforms. For those who were fortunate enough to make it across, as soon as they emerged from the water the uniforms froze to their bodies. And they had still not reached safety. The long, open line of hills south of Lysyanka lay under artillery and tank fire. Under enemy fire, thousands of men, some in frozen uniforms, some half dressed and some completely naked, ran through the snow toward the distant houses of Lysyanka-East. Hundreds of German soldiers who had previously escaped death lost their lives at the Gniloy Tikich, a few hundred meters from the forward outposts of the1st Panzer Division. They died with freedom in sight, the freedom of which they had been dreaming for weeks and for which they had held on.

German Stuka Dive Bombers (JU-87) at Korsun airfield

CONCLUSION

It had not become a second Stalingrad, but two German army corps had ceased to exist and the better part of six divisions, which were soon to be bitterly needed,had been destroyed. Having escaped a twenty-one day battle of encirclement, the ten-thousand German soldiers were not fit for action for some time, and their faith in the highest levels of German command had been severely shaken. The two corps had also lost their entire complement of armaments, equipment, vehicles and horses.

Wiking Waffen SS soldiers at Korsun

WIKING DIVISION AT KORSUN

To bolster the strength of the division, the Walloon volunteer unit 5th SS-Sturmbrigade Wallonien was attached to the division, under command of Leon Degrelle. They were the subject of ridicule from many Wiking veterans until they proved their worth in the fighting for a forest near Teklino, at the head of a salient into the Soviet lines. A second panzer Battalion was also ordered to begin formation in Germany. 

While the 5 SS Wiking was engaged near Teklino, several Red Army tank formations had advanced along the side of the salient and succeeded in encircling the German forces of XLII and XI Army Corps near Korsun.During the battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket, 5 SS Wiking defended against Soviet attacks on the eastern side of the pocket. 

While General of Artillery Wilhelm Stemmermann, the overall commander of the pocket, moved his forces to the west in readiness for an attempt to breakout, 5 SS Wiking, along with the 5th SS Sturmbrigade were ordered to act as the rearguard. After repulsing all Soviet attempts to break through near the town of Novaya-Buda, the 5 SS Wiking rearguard split up and began withdrawing one platoon at a time, under cover of darkness. Advancing through Hell's Gate, the 5 SS Wiking came under heavy fire. The division suffered heavy losses in men and materials during the carnage of the Korsun Pocket. 

Gille, the Divisional commander, had proven his loyalty to his men, fighting alongside them and remaining in action until all survivors had escaped. He was one of the last to cross the Gniloy Tikich River to safety.

Men from the elite 5th Panzer Division Wiking

Wiking SS troops firing at Russian positions at Korsun

BREAKOUT FROM SHENDEROVKA: IN PICTURES

During the freezing cold night of February 16, five divisions of General Hube's 1st SS Panzer Army, (54,000 men) including the 5th SS Division Viking and the Belgian Volunteer Brigade Wallonie, made a last desperate bid to break out of the Russian encirclement around the towns of Korsun and Shandrerovka in the lower Dnieper south-west of Kiev (Kyiv). At 4am, elements of the 8th Army formed up into two marching columns of around 14,000 men each and flocked into two parallel ravines in the surrounding countryside, and where the two ravines met, the troops, now in complete disorder, then emerged into open country and headed out towards the town of Lysyanka. There, disaster struck as troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, under General Konev, were waiting. Soon after 6am, the slaughter began. Soviet tanks drove into the two German columns crushing hundreds under their tracks. Fleeing in panic, the troops were then bombed and shelled before being confronted by units of Cossack cavalry who started hacking them to pieces with their sabres, There was no time to take prisoners and in the short space of three hours around 20,000 German soldiers lay dead, their bodies later dumped in holes dug in the ground. The hundreds of wounded and medical personnel left behind were butchered by the Cossacks. Only a few officers survived, most had fled the scene by plane some days before. (Russian sources put the number of dead during the two weeks of fighting at over 70,000) To reach Lysyanka the troops had first to cross the raging Gniloy-Tikich river. Reaching the opposite side many were transformed into blocks of ice their uniforms frozen to their bodies. About eight thousand others, who had fled the scene and were hiding in the woods, were rounded up during the next few days and taken prisoner. For this great victory, General Konev was awarded the title 'Marshal of the Soviet Union'.

http://members.iinet.net.au/~gduncan/massacres_east.html#USSR

Burying the dead at Janovka. February, 1944.

Slush and mud in the Korsun pocket

Shenderovka. February 16, 1944.Germans hit by Soviet artillery

February 17. Shenderovka. Preparing for the breakout. Destroying what is to be left behind

Shenderovka, Morning of the 17th of February, Day of the breakout

Preparing for the breakout

Breakout, 17th of February 1944

Marching into the cold

A Soviet 152 mm gun destroyed by a panzerfaust

Outskirts of Lysanka. Welcome sight of the German armor. End of an ordeal.

Bread and cigarettes

Posing together

Moving on under the welcome shadow of German tanks

Evacuating the wounded, Buki 20th of February

At Grossno. Peace and rest

VIDEO: BATTLE OF KORSUN POCKET

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SUGGESTED READING

Hell's Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January-February 1944
By Douglas Nash
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KORSUN POCKET: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944
By
Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson
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World War 2 The battle of the Korsun Pocket

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Order of Battle Soviet Army World War 2: 1944 January and February: Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket
by Jean-Luc Marchand (Author), George Nafziger (Editor)