The Eastern Front In 1944

Ostfront 1944: The German Defensive Battles on the Russian Front 1944 (Schiffer military history)
By ALEX BUCHNER
Excerpts

INTRODUCTION

Adolf Hitler was legally named Chancellor of the German Reich on January 30, 1933 by the then Reichspräsident von Hindenburg. Strengthened by domestic and foreign political successes, he quickly became the all-powerful dictator of Germany. Hitler was leader of the political party he had built, the National Socialist German Workers Party, with all of its ubiquitous sub-organizations. He became head of state, Reichskanzler and Reichspräsident in one, and from 1938 was also Commander-in-Chief of all the German Armed Forces. To the German people he remained simply der Führer. In 1939 Hitler launched the campaign against Poland, which widened into the Second World War. Following the subsequent victorious campaigns in Holland, Belgium, France, Norway, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and North Africa he was hailed by German propaganda as the "greatest strategist of all time."

By the beginning of the Russian Campaign Hitler had lost sight of what could be realistically expected from the armed forces which he commanded, subordinating such considerations to his political and economic interests, as well as to thoughts of his own prestige. His unlimited self-overestimation was summed up in one sentence when he took over command of the army during the Winter of 1941: "The little matter of operational command on the Eastern Front is something anyone can do."

At the latest, Hitler's unsuccessful conduct of the war became apparent with the destruction of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad in the Winter of 1942/43 and the final abortive German offensive near Belgorod-Orel in the summer of 1943. From then on the growing Soviet forces launched one offensive after another along the entire front, from Finland to the Black Sea, while the ever more depleted German divisions were constantly on the retreat. The result for the German Army was heavy defeats and disasters which could no longer be made good. Hitler's estimation of the Soviets was such that he always believed they were just about finished.

 This was wishful thinking, because exactly the opposite was true. His whole strategy in the face of the continual enemy advances exhausted itself in obstinacy: no surrender of a single square meter of captured ground , a defense at any price, which made the change to a flexible conduct of the war impossible and denied an elastic defence. Frederick the Great had said: "He who wants to defend everything, defends nothing." With Hitler, on the other hand, unwilling to listen to reason, the watchwords were: hold! - stay put! - not one step back! The bridgeheads, "fortified locations", great advances of the front, and so on, which he demanded, underline this obstinate and stubborn thinking. On the situation maps he saw only the many pencilled-in German divisions and corps without considering that these had long since ceased to possess capabilities equivalent to their designations, and often possessed only half their authorized strengths. Hitler considered the senior commanders at the front, themselves Field Marshals and commanders of armies, as mere takers of orders whom he replaced at will, and who often enough were made scapegoats for his own command errors.

Their freedom of decision was so restricted that any withdrawal or the smallest realignment of the front, even the deployment of a single division, had to be approved by Hitler from his distant headquarters in Rastenburg, East Prussia, or from his home in Berchtesgaden. Two examples should illustrate just how vigorously this policy was enforced: When, in the winter of 1941, General Sponeck dared to withdraw his corps (which consisted of only a single division) from the Crimea on his own initiative because it was in danger of being cut off, he was brought before a court martial on Hitler's orders, sentenced to death and later shot. In early 1944 Hitler declared Rovno in the Ukraine a "fortified location" with a garrison of 600 men. The enemy had already entered the city and there were no reserves available. Generalleutnant Koch therefore ordered his forces to pull back to positions just southwest of Rovno. For this independent order he was sentenced to death by a court martial on Hitler's orders for "reckless disobedience." Massive protests by the army group and army led to Koch's return. Demoted to the rank of Major, he was sent back to the front to "prove himself." To sum up, Hitler saw things as he wished them to be, refusing to admit the facts. The reality was very, very different.

By far the strongest branch of the German Armed Forces, or Wehrmacht, the Army, which by the beginning of 1944 had been forced to wage a more than four year-long war, had already suffered heavy losses, with about 1.6 million dead, including 33,700 officers. These losses weighed especially heavy, because in the face of personnel and materiel shortages they could no longer be replaced. During the almost ceaseless battles of defence and withdrawal on the Eastern Front since mid-1943 the German divisions had literally been burned out, their strength exhausted.

Divisions were now more or less large battle groups. Regiments, battalions and companies, as well as independent battalions and batteries, had sunk to far below their authorized strengths, a large percentage of weapons and equipment had been lost, the units in many cases lacked mobility due to missing equipment, and the men were exhausted as a result of the continuous strain without adequate time to rest and recover. The inadequate numbers of young and inexperienced replacements which reached the front could not make good or replace the heavy losses in experienced soldiers, NCOs and officers, no matter how willing to fight they were. In the field of armaments the most acute shortages were in artillery, assault guns, prime movers, self-propelled weapons, anti-aircraft guns and heavy antitank guns. The one-man anti-tank weapon which had been urgently demanded for so long was only just entering service (the Panzerfaust). As a result, the Soviet tank remained the greatest threat to the German infantryman.

In the panzer force, which had made possible the spectacular "lightning victories" of the early war years - when tanks were employed for strategic purposes for the first time - the divisions had virtually all been reduced to the status of battle groups, and there was a shortage of armored vehicles. Commanders now employed panzer divisions only for local, limited counterattacks and thus they were used up and frittered away. Then there was the defensive system, which due to the shortage of forces scarcely warranted the title. It always consisted of a linear disposition of divisions, one unit beside the other, without any great depth. The line consisted of simple earthworks reinforced by wooden beams, which offered no protection against a direct hit by a heavy artillery shell or a bomb.

These shelters, which also served as the soldiers' quarters, were designated as bunkers. The most forward part of the system of positions formed the Main Line of Resistance (HKL, or Hauptkampflinie), which consisted of a few trenches, infantry positions and earth bunkers, with barbed-wire and mine obstacles in front. Then there was the Main Defensive Position (HKF, or Hauptkampffeld) which was about four or five kilometers in depth. Within this zone were located the positions of the heavy weapons (heavy machine-guns, heavy mortars, anti-tank guns, light and heavy infantry guns), command posts and - when these had made their way up - a limited number of reserves. Behind these were the artillery positions and the supply train areas with their billets - and then the end of the defensive line. Still farther to the rear there were usually well-built blocking, intermediate and rear defence positions, but these were unmanned and therefore worthless. Once the limited depth of the HKL and the HKF had been pierced and the troops manning the defensive line were under constant pressure from the enemy, it was virtually impossible for them to regroup and settle down again in the rear positions. Hitler placed no value in such positions in the rear areas and was often against them. ("They encourage the Generals to have an eye to the rear," he once observed.) As a rule, the available reserves were one division for each army, one battalion for each division and one company for each regiment - a laughable number. It was obvious that any major Soviet offensive must lead to the immediate penetration and breakthrough of such a defence, with all of the unavoidable consequences.

The Luftwaffe still had moderate resources available in early 1944 and provided valuable support. However, following the invasion in the West and the increasingly heavy bombing raids on Germany that summer, its presence diminished. The long-time German command of the air over the Eastern Front was lost. Contrary to what Hitler had so often prophesied, the Russian colossus was not on the verge of collapse. On the contrary, The Red Army had recovered surprisingly quickly from the many defeats of 1941 and 1942, and had become more powerful than ever thanks to the tremendous reserves of man-power in the East, an immense armaments production and the deliveries of materiel from the Allies.

Stalin, dictator of the Soviet Union and Hitler's opposite number, had taken a decisive step when he called not for the defence of the Soviet state, which was loved by few Russians, but appealed to Russian patriotism and proclaimed the "Great Patriotic War." Every Russian understood and approved of the defence of "Mother Russia." A new group of military commanders had replaced the old, which had often failed. They had learned enough of the German principles of command: breakthroughs and subsequent advances without regard to lengthening, open flanks; quick, sweeping movements by tanks and motorized units; pincer operations and double-sided envelopments; encirclement of the enemy with following infantry armies, and so on. Offensives by the individual large formations (Fronts Armies) were always closely coordinated by the senior operations staffs.

The Russian infantry had not become better than the German, but their shattered and decimated units were rebuilt in quick time from the Soviet Union and the recaptured territories, while their vast resources allowed them to form new, fresh and powerful front-line units. Outfitting of the troops with automatic weapons was good, and plenty of anti-tank weapons were on hand. Mobility was increased through growing motorization and the unique Soviet style of infantry riding into battle aboard tanks. Soviet tank units, initially parcelled out in brigades and battalions to support the infantry, had now been concentrated in tank armies and corps.5 These represented extremely mobile operational units possessing considerable striking power. Already streaming from the Soviet tank factories was the proven T-34, supplemented towards the end of the war by the super-heavy "Stalin" tank and large numbers of assault guns. The total production of the Soviet tank industry was enormous.

Stalin himself had declared that artillery was "the God of War." In addition to the lavish numbers of artillery pieces (some of which were quite outstanding, especially the 7.62-cm multi-purpose gun, the much-feared "Ratschbum") supplied to individual divisions, there were independent mortar regiments, artillery divisions and even artillery corps. The concentrations of artillery and the preparatory bombardment before a Soviet offensive were always overwhelming. The greatest surprise in 1944 was the Soviet Air Force, which appeared to have been almost destroyed after the first years of the war, but which now intervened in every battle with tremendous numbers of new bombers and close-support aircraft. In addition to the Soviet arms industry, which in contrast to Germany's was not threatened by enemy air attack and therefore could produce on a tremendous scale, the Red Army was also strengthened by the unhindered deliveries of tanks, aircraft, motor vehicles, weapons and military equipment of every description from the Allies, which reached their peak in 1944.

 Thus in a few sentences the question is answered as to why the Soviets could destroy so many still effective German Eastern Front divisions, often within a brief period of time. In addition to the completely misguided senior German command and the steadily decreasing strength of the German Army, it was the tremendous numerical superiority of the Red Army in soldiers, tanks, artillery and aircraft, in addition to the improved morale brought about by its successes, that had transformed it into an overpowering opponent.6 Germany's military situation at the beginning of 1944 was as follows: The setbacks on the Eastern Front had begun with three major Soviet offensives in the South between November 1942 and January 1943, which had led to the collapse of the entire southern sector.

The Sixth Army had been lost at Stalingrad and Army Group A was forced to evacuate the Caucasus. Not until mid-March 1943 was the Soviet offensive brought to a halt near Kharkov. Germany's attempt to regain the initiative through Operation "Zitadelle" failed when the Red Army succeeded in breaking into the flank and rear of the German Army Group Center near Orel. The Soviet general offensive broke out on July 17, beginning on the Donets. Russian forces, far superior in men and materiel, recaptured the entire area between the Sea of Azov and the Upper Dniepr, cutting off the German-occupied Crimea. On January 4, 1944, Soviet divisions crossed the former Russian-Polish border at Wolhynien. As on all other fronts, the military initiative in the East had passed to the enemy. The battle in North Africa had ended on May 13, 1943, with the surrender of Army Group Afrika in Tunis, and it was only two months later that Allied forces landed in Sicily. Germany's Italian allies could take no more and concluded a cease-fire with the enemy. Encouraged, the Allies landed in southern Italy a few days later.

A new third front had been created, after the battle against the growing strength of the Greek and Yugoslavian partisans had become the second front. And finally, with the landing of the Allies in Normandy on June 6, 1944, there was added a fourth front in the West. The battle by German U-Boats in the Atlantic had been lost and Germany lay increasingly helpless under the bombing attacks of the Allied air forces. The "Battle for Europe", a catch-phrase which originated at that time, had begun. At the beginning of this catastrophic year German divisions in the East were still deep inside Russia in the Crimea, the lower Dniepr and before Leningrad; by the end of the year they had been pushed back to Budapest, the Vistula and as far as East Prussia. Of four German Army Groups, two had been lost, of eleven Armies, six had been destroyed and five badly battered. In the six Eastern Front battles described herein, over 600,000 German soldiers were killed, posted missing or taken prisoner.

A withdrawal of the entire Eastern Front behind an "East Wall" at the beginning of 1944 could have helped avoid these tremendous losses and protected Germany's frontiers in the East.

Downfall: Decline Of Nazi Germany: Crimea, 1944

Russian soldiers remove the swastika from a factory in Voykova, Kerch. 1944.

The faintest hint came from the Battle of Moscow in the harsh winter of 1941. That the invincible German juggernaut was not infallible. Stalingrad underlined it boldly. The days of Hitler were numbered. It was only a matter of time. Kursk was the last strong surge by the Germans to clutch at the rapidly receding victory in Russia.
After that the downfall had begun. A long series of hard fought battles that the German army fought with desperation but all adding to the increasing gloom of the approaching disaster.
We start here with Crimea.

Image (Click to enlarge image)

Ostfront 1944: The German Defensive Battles on the Russian Front 1944 (Schiffer military history)

ALEX BUCHNER

The Crimea - virtually a large island, joined to the mainland in the north by the six- to eight-kilometer-wide Isthmus of Perekop and a rail line whose raised embankment crosses the Sivash. The Sivash, the "foul lake," is a shallow, islandand lagoon-rich body of water. To the south and west extends the Black Sea, and in the east the four- to fifteen-kilometer-wide Strait of Kerch separates the Sea of Azov from the Black Sea and at the same time the Crimea with its Kerch Peninsula from the opposite Taman Peninsula. The Crimea is largely flat, with wide, open plains. Only in the south do the plains rise to form the Jaila Mountains, part of which run along the southern coast. There were few rail lines and a couple of overland roads. In the southwest corner of the Crimea is the city, fortress and harbor of Sevastopol, with a small tongue of land, the Khersonyes Peninsula, with a number of bays, steep rock faces and narrow beach. It was here that the tragedy of the Seventeenth Army was to be played out.

 A German soldier surrenders in 1944 somewhere in the Crimea

GERMANS LOSE CRIMEA: HISTORY IN BRIEF

The Crimean Offensive (8 April - 12 May 1944) — known in German sources as the Battle of the Crimea — was a series of offensives by the Red Army in the effort to liberate Crimea from the German Wehrmacht occupation. The Red Army's 4th Ukrainian Front engaged the German 17th Army of Army Group South, which consisted of German and Romanian formations, in an operation to liberate the Crimean peninsula. The result of the battle was complete victory for the Red Army, and a botched evacuation effort across the Black Sea, leading to significant German and Romanian losses.

During late 1943 and early 1944, the Wehrmacht was pressed back along its entire frontline in the east. In October 1943, the 17th Army was forced to retreat from the Kuban Bridgehead across the Kerch Strait to Crimea. During the following months, the Red Army pushed back the Wehrmacht in southern Ukraine, eventually cutting off the land-based connection of 17th Army through the Perekop Isthmus in November 1943 

 Soviet landings across the Kerch Strait and in the north-eastern sector of the Crimea near Sivash at the end of 1943 set the stage for the liberation of the Crimea from the Germans. For nearly 5 months, the Soviets turned their attention away from the Crimea, instead focusing on pushing Army Group South out of Ukraine, which they were able to do with the highly successful Lower Dnieper and Dnieper-Carpathian Offensives.

 An assault across the Perekop Isthmus was launched on 8 April by elements of the 4th Ukrainian Front's 2nd Guards and 51st Armies. The 17th Army fought well but was unable to stop the advance. Kerch was liberated by the Separate Coastal Army on 11 April; Simferopol, about 37 mi (60 km) northeast of Sevastopol, followed two days later. The 17th Army was retreating toward Sevastopol by 16 April with remaining Axis forces in the Crimea concentrating around the city by the end of the third week of April. The OKW intended to hold Sevastopol as a fortress, as the Red Army had done during the first battle for the Crimea in 1941-1942. However, inadequate preparations made a prolonged defence impossible against the rapid Soviet advance. Fighting broke out in the city outskirts towards the end of April and the city fell on 9 May, less than a month after the start of the offensive.

The Axis sea evacuation to Constanța was attacked by Soviet land-based bombers. The last Axis pockets in the Crimea were destroyed on 12 May. The German and Romanian formations suffered very high irrecoverable losses of 97,000 men, many of whom drowned during the evacuation. The sinking of the Totila and Teja on 10 May alone caused up to 10,000 deaths.

German losses:
Killed and missing: 31,700
Wounded: 33,400
Total: 65,100

Romanian losses:
Killed and missing: 25,800
Wounded: 5,800
Total: 31,600

Total Axis:
Killed and missing: 57,500
Wounded: 39,200
Total: 96,700

 A column of German POW in the Crimea. 1944.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Seventeenth Army, Generaloberst Jaennecke, realized this and ordered plans drawn up and preparations made for a fast, staged evacuation of the Crimea along the Isthmus of Perekop toward the lower Dniepr River. It was his belief that holding on to the Crimea was of no military value whatsoever; on the other hand, his army could significantly strengthen the southern wing of the German eastern front.

Situation as published in the Charlotte News on April 12, 1944

Image source

The Seventeenth Army was already cut off from the mainland and on its own, it was engaged in battle with enemy forces near Perekop and Kerch, and the army's commanders were convinced that an evacuation by sea was inevitable in the near future. In spite of this Hitler stuck to his decision: no matter what, the Crimea was to be defended with all means available. To back up his decision Hitler had two more German divisions1 sent to the Crimea as reinforcements, though two divisions was completely inadequate.

The Russians knew that the Crimea, and if it stayed, the Seventeenth Army, were theirs. They dropped leaflets urging the defenders to desert, mocking the German position: "The Crimea is our largest and most secure prisoner-of-war camp. The Germans feed themselves, guard themselves and when they go on leave they even return voluntarily. We are in no hurry to take the Crimea."

Street fighting in Kerch. 1943

Then, however, the entire situation on the Eastern Front began to deteriorate. From mid-March the Germans were forced to abandon their defenses on the Lower Dniepr, and Soviet offensives along the entire southern front forced Army Group A back beyond the Dnestr. On April 10, Odessa, the Seventeenth Army's most important supply base and port, fell to the Russians. This meant that the army was now totally isolated, 300 kilometers from the new German front, and that from now on it would have to be supplied from the Rumanian port of Constanza, which meant a much loner sea journey. There was till time, however, to evacuate the army by sea with all of its men, horses and materiel. But Hitler stubbornly refused and forbade any evacuation.

 Russian officers pose on top of the wreck of a downed German Messerschmitt fighter. 1944.

With the German northern front smashed, the enemy had a free entrance to the Crimea. As there were no further forces or reserves available, and since the rear of XXXXIX Mountain Corps was also threatened, on April 10 the Seventeenth Army gave the order for a withdrawal toward Sevastopol. The German and Rumanian forces faced a difficult retreat over 160 kilometers of open terrain lacking significant natural obstacles. The result was a race with the pursuing Soviet tanks and motorized infantry.

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The exhausted men breathed a sigh of relief, they had made it. They had reached Sevastopol, and here was the harbor from which they would sail across the Black Sea to freedom. Unbeknown to them, however, a new order from Hitler, issued on April 12 while the retreat was still under way, had arrived, striking the army command a crushing blow: although the Crimea had been lost, the fortress of Sevastopol was to be held indefinitely. That those in the Führer Headquarters imagined the battered units could do so was inconceivable.

VIDEO: HAPPIER TIMES FOR THE GERMANS: OCCUPY CRIMEA 1942

The unending columns, mostly train units and surviving German and Rumanian units, streamed south in the direction of the fortress of Sevastopol. There was now no one who could restore order. The many small groups of infantry interspersed among the columns stopped, fought briefly and then hurried westward again. Late on the afternoon of April 13 the 'main body' of the 98th Division reached Ssudak and halted. The hours of waiting made the soldiers jumpy and uneasy. It became dark. Firing began. First it was only an anti-tank gun. Shell after shell landed in the village. It was the opening act of a partisan ambush of the columns as they prepared to move on. Hand grenades came flying down. Submachine-gun fire sprayed from windows and rooftops. There were muzzle flashes everywhere. Several trucks drove away, but became lost in the darkness and got stuck. The columns were close to panic. There was still a few of the 'old warriors' left, however, and they saved the situation by placing well-aimed bursts of fire on the muzzle flashes. Soon things had quieted down; the threat of panic had been averted. The columns resumed their march at about midnight.

 Captured German POW in the Crimea. 1944

Sevastopol at that time was the scene of tremendous confusion. Commanders assembled their troops, headquarters tried to establish contact with their units, new units were created out of thin air, supplies and munitions were organized, sectors assigned and command posts set up. A steady flow of stragglers, men who had escaped the Russians, was arriving from all over the Crimea, in ones and twos, on foot or in overcrowded vehicles. Parking areas were filled with large numbers of useless and abandoned vehicles of every kind. An especially sad fate awaited the many horses.

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On Hitler's orders no more units were permitted to leave the Crimea. The order from the army command on April 16 read: There will not be one step back in the defense of the fortress of Sevastopol! Viewed in the short term, this order was justifiable in permitting an orderly evacuation of the many personnel still on the peninsula. The fighting troops saw this, and even though conditions were extremely difficult they retained the necessary fighting spirit. Even after the deep disappointment caused by Hitler's renewed order to hold out, the soldiers still trusted their Commander-in-Chief, the man who had brought them out of the Kuban Bridgehead in an orderly manner. They were prepared to fight on until the order finally came to evacuate the Crimea and the ships arrived to take them away. Keeping the harbor and coast free for this purpose depended on their steadfastness.

Sevastopol was not the fortress it had been in early 1942, when it took German forces weeks of the heaviest fighting to capture it. The mighty fortress works had been shot up and blown apart, German-installed naval guns and coastal batteries faced seaward, the existing bunkers, forts and casemates had not been repaired an were serving as bullet-proof accommodations for headquarters, hospitals, assembly areas and so on. The field positions in the main line of resistance had been beefed up, with barbed wire in front, but there was no in-depth system of defenses with strongpoints or a second and third line. Because of the hard limestone the trenches could not be dug deep enough. The only well-built rear position was on the small Khersonyes Peninsula. The poor state of the fortress was not the only disadvantage facing the defenders. During the retreat the Luftwaffe had lost all its airfields in the Crimea and was left with only two fields near Sevastopol and on the Khersonyes Peninsula, which would soon be under Soviet artillery fire.

A German signboard at the entrance to the seafront in Sevastapol. A relic from the recent past when the Germans briefly ruled .

The initial difficult and costly positional fighting saw all enemy attacks repulsed; the northern front held firm. On April 27 the Soviets felt strong enough to launch their first major attack. Supported by large numbers of tanks and closesupport aircraft, they struck in the southeast, attacking toward the Sapun Heights. The attack collapsed with heavy casualties. The Soviets had not yet completed their artillery buildup, however. Mercifully, the troops had not learned of Hitler's obstinate, completely incomprehensible order. However, it was clear to the Commander-in-Chief of the Seventeenth Army that Sevastopol could not be held much longer, and that a total evacuation was imperative if the army was not to be lost. The enemy was building up his forces rapidly, the situation was becoming ever more acute and it was only a question of time until the German front was overrun, which would mean the end. Generaloberst Jaennecke therefore decided on an unusual step. On April 28 he flew to Führer Headquarters to convince Hitler to authorize an immediate and total evacuation. In spite of his forcible presentation Hitler remained unmoved. Finally, his rage became so great that he relieved Jaennecke as Commander-in-Chief of the army and forbade him from returning to Sevastopol. General Allmendinger assumed command of the army.

Russian soldiers examine a wrecked German Panzer 3

For more than half a year the Seventeenth Army had held the Crimea, following an insane order. Now the end was near for the remaining defenders. No more ships came to pick them up. When the morning of May 12 dawned the Black Sea was again empty and quiet and endlessly wide. 

Since any further resistance had become senseless, at about 0800 the bulk of the remaining troops in the area of the northern embarkation points, including the commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, Generalmajor Böhme, surrendered. Artillery fired on the barely 25-meter-wide beach between the bluffs and the sea at the embarkation points on the western coast, where several thousand men still cowered among the rocks and crevices and at the steep cliffs. Then Russian tanks attacked the last line of defence. Further resistance was useless. 

General Gruner, commander of the 111th Infantry Division, walked toward one of the tanks to surrender. The tank opened fire, killing the General. 

Then, as was so often the case with the Soviets, the officers and highly-decorated soldiers were led away from the others. This was followed by shots and screams. The remaining Russian auxiliaries who had served the Germans were lined up along the cliffs and shot. 

Then, on this hot summer day, the last remnants of the Seventeenth Army, over 15,000 Germans and Rumanian troops, were assembled into long columns and marched past the whirring Soviet newsreel cameras into captivity. For most of them there would be no return. 

Other groups of German troops refused to surrender and continued to hold out. German aerial reconnaissance revealed that elements were still holding out around the embarkation points at 1500, probably in the desperate hope that they would still be rescued. They held out until their ammunition was gone. Others preferred to risk everything rather than be captured.


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"Little Stalingrad": Battle Of Velikiye Luki

Velikie Luki, a small town near Kalinin in North Russia saw some very fierce fighting at the same time when the ferocious Battle of Stalingrad raged in the south. Velikiye Luki ("Great Bow or Bend" in Russian) was important for the Russians because it lay on the railway line that linked the German Army North and Army Centre.

The small garrison of Germans in the town was surrounded by the Russians and the ensuing fighting was as fierce as that at Stalingrad. The town fell to the Russians in January 1943.

German soldiers taken prisoner in the Great Bow. December 1942. During Luki offensive November 24, 1942 - January 21, 1943 in the Great Bow was surrounded by a group of German troops after heavy fighting, and January 17, 1943. The 7000 strong German garrison was destroyed, and the city liberated by Soviet troops.

The battle for Velikiye Luki was a part of Soviet Operation "Mars" in November-December of 1942.

The actions against Velikiye Luki began in November, 25th by the troops of the right flank of the Kalinin Front. In November, 28th the troops of the 3rd Shock Army ouflanked Velikiye Luki from both sides and encircled there the most part of the German 83rd Infantry Division (about 7,000 men). The Germans sent two panzer, and one motorized divisions and one motorized brigade (it was in the time when Manstein tried to save the German troops in Stalingrad and to stop the Soviet advance) to breakthrough the encirclement around Velikiye Luki but their attempts had failed. The German panzers approached to Velikiye Luki on the distance of 10 kms but then they were repelled. In January, 13th of 1943 the remains of Velikiye Luki's garrison had surrendered. The Soviets captured 4,000 soldiers and officers of the German 83rd Infantry Division there.
armchair general

(Click to enlarge map)

In the wet snows of late November 1942, the Soviet army struck at the thinly manned German front lines north and south of the city on the river, surrounding the vital supply center and trapping its garrison while threatening to cut off and encircle an entire German army group. Adolf Hitler forbade a breakout and ordered that the surrounded troops be supplied by air. Relief attacks never quite had the necessary strength to break through the encircling Russians, and by late January 1943 the city was again in Russian hands, the German defenders either dead or taken prisoner. The encirclement of Velikiye Luki bore a strong resemblance to the well-known Nazi debacle that was unfolding at the same time at Stalingrad.
Historynet

A Russian soldier beside a destroyed German panzer. Velikiye Luki. Early 1943

The Soviet offensive began on November 24, with strong forces moving on Velikiye Luki from north and south, bypassing the screen of fortified positions in a semicircular arc east of the city. Encountering only scattered resistance and racing through the snow, by nightfall the Soviets had Velikiye Luki nearly surrounded. The German units dug in along the Kuban Stream were overrun so quickly that the Soviets were able to launch attacks against the city proper the next day. The attackers, however, were repulsed with heavy losses. More assaults came on the 26th, but again the Germans held. Russian attacks came almost daily in the following seven weeks. Although the Germans inflicted ruinous losses on the enemy, their own casualties mounted. On the 27th, the Soviet 357th Rifle Division completed the encirclement of the city. The last telephone call into Sass' headquarters came that day. From then on, communication with the trapped defenders was by radio only.

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As the battle of Stalingrad raged in Southern Russia, an equally ferocious battle raged at Velikiye Luki in Northern Russia. It is called "little Stalingrad" by many historians.

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 Heavy street fighting in Velikiye Luki

Velikiye Luki was crucial to both sides. To the Germans it was a bulwark protecting the vital railway supplying Army Group North, which passed through Novosokolniki some 20 kilometers to the west. Loss of that rail line might have forced Army Group North to lift the siege of Leningrad. Given Hitler's penchant for standing fast no matter what the military situation, this turn of events could have caused Army Group North to be trapped against the Gulf of Riga. 

 But if the German high command thought Velikiye Luki was important, the Soviet high command considered it crucial. Their efforts to recapture the city started in August 1941, soon after its capture, and continued almost without pause until January 1943. To the Soviets, the city's recapture meant much more than threatening the supply lines of Army Group North. The Russians' ultimate objective was to slice into the rear of Army Group Center, anchored 30 kilometers south at Velizh. Such a move would threaten to encircle and unhinge the entire German front. Smolensk would surely fall, and trapping Army Group North would merely be a bonus. The stakes were no less than the fate of two German army groups.

Soviet planes that took part in the battle

On January 15 1943, the last radio messages came from the eastern sector. At 0440 hours Sass (The German officer in charge of Velikiye Luki) radioed, 'A breakout appears out of the question; because almost 2,000 wounded would fall into Russian hands…help must immediately come from the outside. Urgently request reply.' Again at 0720 he sent: 'We cannot break out. You must immediately break through to us.' At 0840 came the last intelligible message from the beleaguered garrison: 'Urgently request artillery fire.' After that there was nothing. Velikiye Luki was officially declared lost on January 16.

Von Sass and seven other officers are stated to have been executed in the main square of Velikiye Luki in January 1946, after a tribunal convicted them of war crimes against POWs and civilians in and around the city.

VIDEO: FIGHTING IN VELIYE LUKI

A Propaganda picture? Russian soldiers enjoy music before going to battle in Velikiye Luki

ESTIMATES OF LOSSES DURING THE VELIKIYE LUKI BATTLE

Russian. - 30,000 dead and thousands wounded. 

More than 600 armored vehicles destroyed 

400 guns lost. 

63 aircraft destroyed. 

German. - 17,000 dead and thousands of prisoners. 

Hundreds of armored vehicles, antitank guns and artillery. 

Over 80 bombers, transport aircraft, Heinkel He-111 and 

Junkers Ju-53 destroyed.  

Forlorn German POW after the siege of Velikiye Luki was over with grinning Russian soldiers. Most of the Germans were shot or hanged soon after

THE RUSSIANS DEALT WITH THE GERMAN POW RUTHLESSLY AFTER THE BATTLE

Revenge by the Soviets after the collapse of the citadel was rough.  Each of the officers who fought in Velikie Luki were hanged in the plaza of the citadel. The others were sentenced to 20 to 25 years in prison. Only 11 returned to Germany between 1953 and 1955. The citadel of Velikie Luki was one of the most disputed point in the battle of winter 42-43.

MORE ON THE BATTLE OF VELIKIYE LUKI

Velikie Luki has been claimed as the birthplace of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. The city, which had 30,000 people at the beginning of the war was taken in August 1941 after heavy fighting, by the Lower Saxony Armored Division, units of the 20th Division of Hesse, and the 253rd Infantry Division. 

 First attempt to liberate the fortress. - On January 1942, Captain General Yeremenko, and General Purkaiev, launched the offensive to relieve the critical situation on the Moscow front, the attack was a failure against the formidable rampart formed in the line Velikie Luki. The units of the 83 Infantry Division (transferred from France, in a hurry) defended the "Swamp City", an important route of entry in the path of Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow, to White Russia.

A Russian soldier covers the advance of his comrades. January 17, 1943. Velikiye Luki

Months later, the summer of 42, the 3rd Army Soviet assault attacked hard again with all kinds of artillery, but the 277th Grenadier Regiment, commanded by Colonel Von Rappard had fortified itself strongly in the city. 

On November 19, 1942 began the second Russian offensive at Stalingrad, but first they had to seize Velikie Luki. The offensive in Velikiye started in November 24. The attacks continued daily for seven weeks. The siege of the city was completed on November 27. The casualties on both sides were heavy, but for the German side were irreplaceable. The city with over 20,000 defenders, of which 7.500 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Sass guarded the front, consisted of grenadiers, gunners, sappers, health, railway troops, observers, and security forces. 

Because the defensive perimeter was less than 18 square kilometers, Stukas were first used for giving supplies, however soon the food and ammunition were reduced by half.    

 The December 26th attack launched from the south and southeast with powerful armored formations, was fought house to house. The Russian rifle battalions fought with extraordinary courage, formed of the Komsomol (young communists). 

On January 43, two strong pockets of resistance remained, the citadel and the railway station. The Germans defended the citadel with 427 men, and at the station, known by the name "Budapest position" stood Lieutenant Colonel von Sass with a thousand soldiers. Food was depleting. The 300 horses had been eaten, bread was distributed among 10 men, and a can of meat amongst 20 men. The German soldiers were cold, tired, full of parasites, starving and being punished daily with 3000 shells of every caliber. Water (For which they had to risk their lives) was collected from a small pond. 

The city was destroyed in the fighting

There were several attempts to help the besieged by Colonel Baron Von Wolff. The Mitzlaff battalion made an assault on the hills to the east (and could see the towers of the citadel) but had to retire. The attempt by the famous 80 Reg Of Artillery Colonel Von Skotti was also a  failure. After several attempts using paratroopers and armor, the Germans withdrew. 

Only a small force of men managed to flee to German positions. The wounded Germans were left abandoned. 

The commander of the German garrison at Velikiye Luki was Lieutenant Colonel von Sass. 

Velikie Luki was declared lost by the Germans on January 16, 1943, although some fighting continued in the city, it was already in Russian hands.

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THE STORY OF VELIKIYE LUKI

(http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/20234/20-2343.htm)

By mid-November 1942 the northernmost corps sector of Army Group Center extended seventy miles, from the town of Velizh north to the army group boundary. Inadequately covered by LIX Corps, the line contained two large gaps, each about ten miles wide and partly swampy but not entirely impassable. There, only reconnaissance and combat patrols provided a minimum of security. Despite persistent requests by the army group commander, no reinforcements arrived to strengthen the precarious German defenses on that sector.

Late in November the Russians attacked north and south of Velikiye Luki  and succeeded in encircling the city which was held by a strong regimental combat team of the 83d Division. A few miles farther south two additional German combat teams suffered the same fate. Thus three separate German pockets completely cut of from the main force were created in the same general area.

Remains of the German garrison at Velikie Luki

By that time all available reserves of Army Group Center had been thrown into the fierce battle at Rzhev and could not be extricated for the relief of the encircled units in the Velikiye Luki area. The army group commander therefore requested authority from Army High Command to order breakouts of the encircled forces toward the west. If carried out at once, these could have been accomplished without great difficulty or excessive casualties, but it would have meant pulling the German line back about ten to fifteen miles. The new defense positions, as proposed by army group, would still assure the undisturbed operation of the Nevel-Novosokolniki-Nasva railroad, and the resulting Russian salient was then to be reduced, as soon as possible, by a German flank attack from the south.

(Click To Enlarge Map) Image source

Hitler, who in December 1941 had assumed direct control of all military operations in Russia, flatly rejected this proposal. Instead, he ordered that the pockets be held at all costs, that other German forces, by attacking from the west, re-establish contact with the encircled units, and that the front be pushed even farther to the east. He referred to a recent German success in a similar situation at Kholm by the same officer who now commanded the 83d Division in the area of Velikiye Luki. Army group tried in vain to call Hitler's attention to the lack of reserves and the extreme hardships imposed by winter weather and difficult terrain. All such representations were impatiently brushed aside.

The two German combat teams surrounded in the area south of Velikiye Luki meanwhile conducted a fighting withdrawal toward the west. With the assistance of other German forces, they broke out of encirclement and succeeded in establishing a new front.

At Velikiye Luki the Germans had previously constructed a perimeter of hasty field fortifications around the town. Advance positions, located several hundred yards from the edge of the city, proved of considerable value during the initial stages of the siege. The encircled garrison consisted of a strong infantry regiment of the 83d Division, two artillery battalions, one observation battalion, one engineer company, two construction battalions, and strong service and supply units. The pocket commander, a lieutenant colonel, had assumed command of his regiment only a few days earlier, and accordingly did not know his troops.

Main city building at Velikiye Luki after the guns fell silent

The enemy had so disposed his forces that at the beginning of December only two Russian brigades were deployed in a wide arc west of Velikiye Luki. As late as two weeks after the pocket was closed, a breakout in that direction would still have been possible, but despite the personal intervention of the army group commander, Hitler did not change his mind. The pocket was to be held, and should only be relieved by a push from the west.

With no reinforcements in sight, the troops required for this relief thrust could only be taken from other sectors of Army Group Center, all of which had been severely drained in an attempt at strengthening Ninth Army at Rzhev. The direction for the attack was to be from southwest to northeast with the so-called citadel a part of Velikiye Luki west of the Lovat River designated as the primary objective. 

It was obvious that LIX Corps, already responsible for an excessively wide sector of the front, could not be expected to take on the additional task of conducting this attack. The situation not only called for the use of fresh combat units but also for the establishment of a new tactical headquarters to direct the proposed relief operation. Unable to pull out a corps headquarters from any other sector, army group had to resort to an improvisation. A provisional corps headquarters, Corps Woehler, was formed under the command of the army group chief of staff assisted by the army group training officer, the chief artillery officer, and another young staff officer. Subordinate to LIX Corps which remained responsible for supply and administration, the newly formed command group was ready to take charge of the front sector opposite Velikiye Luki by mid-December. Its command post, established on 15 December at Lovno, was no less improvised than the staff by which it was occupied. A one-room peasant hut had to serve as living and working quarters for six officers, three clerks, three drivers, and two orderlies.

The terrain designated for the attack was desolate, rolling country, virtually without forests. Here Stalin's scorched earth policy had been fully effective in the Russian retreat of 1941. Subsequent partisan operations completed the work of destruction. Most of the formerly inhabited places had vanished and even their last traces were now blanketed by heavy layers of snow. No roads or recognizable terrain features broke the monotony. Orientation was extremely difficult and at night a matter of pure chance. The entire area gave the impression of a landscape on the moon.

The German units initially available for the attack were a division from East Prussia, the 83d Division minus elements inside Velikiye Luki, the mountain regiment that had escaped encirclement south of the city, and two construction battalions. They had been weakened by considerable losses in men and materiel and were suffering from the effects of heavy frosts alternating with sudden thaws. Although their morale appeared unbroken, their combat value was definitely limited. Fortunately, their new commander, because of his experience as army group chief of staff, had no difficulty in finding out at what depots in the army group area ammunition and equipment could still be obtained. With railroads and transport planes doing their part, it took only a few days for the troops to be resupplied and re-equipped with new winter clothing. This brought about a rapid decline in the number of cold weather casualties.

Reinforced by a motorized division, a battalion of light infantry, two batteries of 105-mm. guns, and a rocket projector brigade, the improvised corps continued its preparations for the attack. They had to be cut short, however, since Hitler advanced the attack date by several days despite all objections by army group. The attack was launched shortly before Christmas but, after making good progress at first, bogged down at the half-way mark.

January 17, 1943. Russian troops on the outskirts of the city

By now it had become clear that additional forces of considerable strength would have to be brought up in order to achieve success. The reinforcements finally made available consisted of two divisions and one tank battalion. At least one of these divisions, however, proved wholly inadequate for the type of operation in which it was to participate. Originally used as an occupation unit in western Europe, it had recently been transferred east and employed as a security force on a quiet sector of the Russian front. Two of its regimental commanders were considerably over-age and incapable of  leading their units in combat. The third regimental commander, who was still in good physical condition, actually had to command each of the three regiments in turn as they were successively committed in the attack.

Army group had requested the approval of the Air Force for the employment of a parachute division which was then in a quiet position southeast of Velizh.[Ed.: In the German system of organization, parachute units were part of the Luftwaffe.] Goering refused, insisting that the division remain intact in its present position. Undoubtedly this refusal was one of the chief reasons why the liberation of Velikiye Luki failed.

The second German relief thrust was launched early in January 1943. Leading elements advanced to less than five miles from the northwestern outskirts of the beleaguered city. At that stage, however, enemy pressure against the long flanks of the penetration forced the Germans to assume the defensive.

Inside the pocket, the citadel on the left bank of the Lovat River had meanwhile become the refuge for some 500 wounded from all parts of the city. On 5 January the Russians attacked from the north and succeeded in cutting through the town and severing the citadel from the main part of Velikiye Luki. Thus two separate pockets came into existence, each one precariously defended after the loss of all positions beyond the edge of the town, and particularly threatened by enemy attempts at infiltrating from block to block.

Liberating the main German force encircled in the eastern part of Velikiye Luki had become even more difficult. In any event, the immediate objective was to cut through the ring of encirclement that surrounded the smaller pocket west of the river. A general advance of the corps front, however, as demanded by Hitler, was by now definitely out of the question.

After lengthy negotiations the Air Force finally released one battalion of its parachute division for commitment at Velikiye Luki. It was too little and too late, but a last attempt had to be made to open a rescue corridor to the citadel. In order to bolster the fighting strength of the encircled garrison, a reinforced company of light infantry riding on trucks and tank destroyers was to ram its way through the enemy into the surrounded citadel. On 10 January, in a daring daylight attack, this force took the Russians by surprise and succeeded in joining the German defenders inside the pocket.

During the night of 14-15 January, the parachute battalion was to advance in a surprise attack to the southwest side of the citadel. There, by 0100, the fresh troops recently arrived in the pocket were to attempt a breakout, taking with them all wounded who were still able to march. Although initially led by a regimental commander familiar with the area, the parachute battalion lost its way in the featureless terrain and failed to reach its objective. The citadel force broke out nevertheless, and in the early morning hours, reduced by casualties to about 150 men, appeared at the corps' advance command post on the Novosokolniki-Velikiye Luki railroad line.

By now, irreplaceable losses in the ranks of the German relief force made it impossible to repeat the rescue attempt. Also, no more radio signals were coming from the eastern part of Velikiye Luki a clear indication that in six weeks of relentless fighting, despite the most determined resistance, the German force in the eastern pocket had been wiped out to the last man. The pocket commander's final radio message, received on 14 January, was, "With last strength and ammunition still holding two bunkers in center of city. Enemy outside my command post."

The struggle for Velikiye Luki was over. While it had the erect of tying down a greatly superior and constantly growing enemy force for six weeks, it also resulted in the annihilation of the German garrison, exorbitant casualties among the relief forces, and a loss of terrain along the entire corps sector. (Map 3) The important Nevel-Novosokolniki-Nasva railroad line still remained in German hands, free from enemy interference. However, the plan proposed by army group would have assured the same result without necessitating the futile struggle for Velikiye Luki. At the end of this ill-fated operation German casualties amounted to 17,000 officers and men, 5,000 of whom perished in the beleaguered city, while 12,000 were lost in rescue attempts from outside. Even if the relief thrust had eventually succeeded, the cost was far too high.

The experiences gained at Velikiye Luki might be summarized as follows:

1. Wherever a pocket comes into existence, it is usually the result of the attacker's numerical superiority over the encircled force. The deliberate adoption of a pocket-type defense can only be justified when early relief is assured; otherwise it will lead to the loss of the entire pocket force, and thus to a further decrease in the over-all fighting strength of the forces in the field.

2. The enemy's effective military strength, his combat troops, is his principle means of waging war. It must be destroyed. To fight constantly for terrain features, industrial installations, or simply for propagandistic purposes is to violate the basic principles of warfare.

3. It was Hitler who originally pronounced: "I must hold all pockets to the last in order to tie up superior enemy forces as long as possible." This may be correct in exceptional cases, but can never be elevated to the level of a general principle. 

4. If an encircled force must be liberated by a relief thrust from the outside, only the best troops should be used in that operation. The more rapidly such a mission is completed, the fewer will be the casualties, and the greater the success. The maintenance for any length of time of a long, narrow salient obviously pointing at the pocket will involve murderous casualties. In the end such tactics are almost certain to fail because of the pressure exerted by the enemy on both flanks of the salient.

5. Speed is an absolute requirement, but should not be gained at the cost of hasty and inadequate preparations. The selection and assembly of the relief forces involves careful deliberation and considerable effort. In the situation described, the supreme commander, on whose specific order the date for the attack had been moved up, was far away from the fighting front, and the effect of this intervention proved disastrous. There was nothing to justify such lack of confidence in the judgment of the local commander or in the recommendations of army group.

6. Constant communication with the encircled forces was maintained via radio which functioned smoothly and met all requirements. On several occasions the artillery fire of the relief force was actually directed by observers inside the pocket. Shuttle flights by liaison aircraft were possible only in the beginning, and then only at night.

7. Having the light infantry unit break out of the citadel at night proved to be a wise decision. Direction toward the forward elements of the rescue force was maintained with the aid of prismatic compasses. Advancing in several single files, the men succeeded in inching their way forward through the hollows and silently overpowering the Russian sentries.

8. Supply of the German pocket was at first effected from reserve stocks available at Velikiye Luki. Soon, however, airdrops became necessary, marking the first occurrence of a situation that was later so characteristic of all German pockets in Russia the plight of encircled forces, inadequately supplied with ammunition, rations, and equipment, who were expected to do their utmost in a hopeless situation. If Hitler himself had ever been an eyewitness to such developments, Goering's arrogant promises of adequate air supply for German pockets might have been discounted once and for all. The Luftwaffe units concerned were not in any way to blame. The missions assigned to them proved impossible of fulfillment, but they did their duty again and again in a superior manner, at Velikiye Luki, as well as at Stalingrad, and in all subsequent cases where German ground troops found themselves in hopeless encirclement.